Mitigating security issues in the evolving DNA synthesis industry by Turlington, Ralph Donald, III
Mitigating Security Issues in the                                             
Evolving DNA Synthesis Industry 
by 
 
Ralph Donald Turlington III 
 
B.A. Economics 
B.S. Environmental Science 
University of Virginia, 2010 
 
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
Master of Science in Technology and Policy 
 
at the 
 
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
June 2013 
 
© Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2013.  All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
Signature of Author ……………………………………………………………………… 
Technology and Policy Program 
Engineering Systems Division 
May 14, 2013 
 
 
 
 
Certified by ……………………………………………………………………………….. 
Kenneth A. Oye 
Associate Professor of Engineering Systems and of Political Science 
Thesis Supervisor 
 
 
 
Accepted by ……………………………………………………………………………… 
Dava J. Newman 
Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and of Engineering Systems 
Director, Technology and Policy Program 
  2 
This page intentionally left blank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  3 
Mitigating Security Issues in the                                             
Evolving DNA Synthesis Industry 
 
 
by 
 
Ralph Donald Turlington III 
 
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division on May 14, 2013 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Science in Technology and Policy 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
DNA synthesis technologies are advancing at exponential rates, with production 
of ever longer, more complex, and less expensive sequences of double stranded 
DNA.  This has fostered development of industrial scale design, construction, 
and sale of synthetic DNA.  The tools and methods of synthesis used to create 
beneficial genetic material can also be used to construct dangerous pathogens.  
 
To prevent unknown actors from ordering potentially dangerous genetic material, 
the largest DNA synthesis firms formed two industry associations that require 
members to screen the DNA sequences ordered and the customers ordering 
sequences.  The firms also worked with the U.S. Health and Human Services to 
formulate voluntary screening guidelines for synthetic double stranded DNA.  As 
DNA synthesis technology advances and diffuses, this centralized voluntary 
approach may become less effective. 
 
This thesis identifies strengths and weakness in the current voluntary regime and 
offers recommendations to improve security in the DNA synthesis industry. It 
describes the origins and current status of DNA synthesis technologies and the 
structure of the DNA synthesis industry.  Then, it describes the formation of 
voluntary screening consortia and the U.S. and international guidelines that 
address security issues in DNA synthesis.  Finally, this thesis compares DNA 
synthesis with other potentially “dual use” technologies, concludes that regulatory 
approaches may not enhance security in this area, and suggests that 
governments should focus on education and outreach. 
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1. Introduction 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) can be considered the instruction manual for all life 
on earth.  Francis Crick, James Watson, and Maurice Wilkins discovered its 
structure in 1951, the double helix.  DNA is naturally formed, created, and 
replicated in living cells.  It is composed of specific base nucleotides1 that can 
create genetic information when placed in  certain sequences and lengths.  This 
genetic information is linked together as genes.  These genes code for different 
amino acid sequences that, in turn, combine together in different ways to form 
different proteins.  Genes also include DNA sequences that notify the cell when 
and when not to code proteins.  Proteins transfer the information stored in the 
DNA to actual actions by the cell and its components.  In the human body, there 
are an estimated 150,000 individual genes that code for a specific amino acid 
sequence (Human Genome Project, 2013). 
 
The chemical synthesis of DNA began in the early 1950s.  In the mid 1980s, 
genes that code for DNA replication proteins were isolated from natural bacteria 
living near thermal vents.  The isolated genes allowed for the rapid replication of 
DNA in high temperatures.  This led to the creation of a process known as 
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) (Baker, 1992). PCR allowed for a very small 
amount of genetic material to be quickly and accurately copied millions of times.  
While the DNA created by PCR was not completely synthetic, the ability to 
replicate millions of copies of a very small amount of DNA allowed for the 
creation of more powerful, completely automated synthesizers. 
 
Today, DNA that is not isolated from a living cell, but is created through the use 
of modern DNA synthesizers, is termed synthetic DNA.  This DNA is often 
created by large DNA synthesis companies and is often synthesized with its base 
pairs following an exact order that a researcher requests. A computer can now 
build specific DNA sequences of varying lengths (Gibson, 2010).  To supply 
                                            
1 There are only four nucleic acids in DNA: adenine, guanine, thymine, and 
cytosine. 
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researchers and companies with synthetic DNA, an industry has been created 
that is constantly producing faster, more automated, and more complex synthesis 
machines. 
 
This automated synthesis accelerated development of different biotechnologies.  
Many leading supporters and practitioners of genetic engineering and synthetic 
biology, including George Church, Drew Endy, and Bill Gates, believe that 
biofuels, medical advances, bioremediation, and other applications are the next 
frontier in genetic engineering.  Biotechnology could be the defining technology 
of the 21st century, much like microchips and computers were for the 20th 
century. 
 
1.1 The Challenge of DNA Synthesis as a Dual Use Technology 
For all of the benefits DNA synthesis may provide, there are security issues in 
the global DNA synthesis industry.  DNA synthesis is a dual use technology.  A 
dual use technology refers to materials, hardware, and knowledge that have 
peaceful applications but could also be exploited for harmful purposes (Tucker, 
2012).  Other examples of dual use technologies include nuclear technologies 
that are able to produce both nuclear power and nuclear weapons, chemical 
technologies that are able to provide for a chemical industry and chemical 
weapons, and missile technologies that are able to launch satellites into space, 
and send warheads to targets around the world. 
 
There are several similarities and differences between DNA synthesis technology 
and the technologies listed above. With advances in the automation and 
accuracy of DNA synthesis since the 1980s, it is now possible to construct entire 
genes and microbial genomes 2 from off-the-shelf chemicals.  This raises a 
number of security concerns.  Someone could order a gene sequence coding for 
a dangerous pathogen and then perform a few low skilled steps to create a 
dangerous, self-replicating microbe.  This ability to create a dangerous pathogen 
                                            
2 Bacteria and other microscopic organisms and their associated DNA. 
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with little training in genetic engineering has been improved with the use of 
computers to forward design3 genetic components.  This ability to forward design 
has led to the creation of the commercial suppliers we see today.  These 
commercial suppliers exist not only in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, but also in 
the developing world, including countries in Asia, South America, and the Middle 
East.  Many of the current major suppliers in this emerging field are based in the 
U.S. and Western Europe, where much of the biotechnology boom started.  
However, both China and India, along with other developing countries, are 
investing heavily in their own biotechnology sectors (Larson, 2013). 
 
As the industry currently exists, the largest U.S. and European companies belong 
to one of two voluntary consortia.  These organizations set standards and 
protocols for screening synthetic DNA orders.  The screening seeks out 
dangerous DNA sequences, which can include parts that can code for dangerous 
genetic parts.  These dangerous parts would include the genetic sequences that 
make microbes like smallpox, plague, and Ebola virus so virulent.  Many of the 
largest U.S. and European synthesis companies have voluntarily incorporated 
these safety precautions into their business practices.  In addition, members of 
these consortia also screen their customers.  This screening attempts to prevent 
shipments to customers that should not be working with synthetic DNA. 
 
Currently, emerging economies that are developing DNA synthesis industries are 
not always taking strong precautions to screen potential customers.  This is a 
negative security externality that is not accounted for in existing markets. This 
externality leads to a lowered level of security for everyone.  Any single synthesis 
company that does not screen its orders could allow an unknown and potentially 
dangerous order to be created and shipped.  This would make all of the 
precautionary practices by other companies nearly irrelevant, as a nefarious 
                                            
3  Forward design: the ability to engineer a system from the ground up by 
designing all the components before you begin to build them. 
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actor could simply order dangerous genetic elements from a company that does 
not screen orders.    
 
Tools and strategies that have been used for other dual use technologies may be 
studied as a starting point for addressing this externality.  However, these tools 
and strategies may face issues when directly applied to DNA synthesis 
technology.  Many of today’s existing security measures were created before a 
synthetic DNA industry had developed, so security efforts need improvement. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
This thesis addresses the following questions: 
 
• What is DNA synthesis? 
• What is the DNA synthesis industry and how did it develop? 
• What are current national and international security measures and how 
did they come to exist? 
• What are some technologies that DNA synthesis can be compared and 
contrasted to? 
• Where is the DNA synthesis industry headed? 
• What are some policies to encourage the secure development of DNA 
synthesis technologies? 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure and Organization 
This thesis seeks to study how the DNA synthesis industry developed, examine 
the current standards for security in the DNA synthesis industry, and suggest a 
number of different policies that would allow the international DNA synthesis 
industry to develop while mitigating its associated security issues. 
 
This framework will consider the many sides of the DNA synthesis industry and 
its industrial structure, including the current state of safety and security practices, 
the growth of DNA synthesis companies in emerging economies, and where the 
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DNA synthesis industry is headed.  In addition, this thesis will examine how the 
current industry players could possibly use regulations to capture more of the 
market and prevent new players from entering the market and increasing 
competition. 
 
To achieve its objective, this thesis will: 
 
Provide a background on DNA synthesis and the current DNA synthesis 
industry.  DNA synthesis has become increasingly automated since the mid-
1980s.  This rise in the automation of DNA synthesis was coupled with a rise in 
genetic engineering.  This thesis will describe the history of DNA synthesis 
technology and its current capabilities.  It will also describe how the technology’s 
development led to the establishment of a multi-company network of large DNA 
synthesizers. 
 
Describe the industrial structure of the DNA synthesis industry.  The current 
DNA synthesis industry is dominated by a few large players based mostly in the 
U.S. and Western Europe.  However, large companies from emerging economics 
are entering the industry, along with start-up companies in the U.S. whose new 
technologies threaten to change the existing industry.  These large players will 
be compared to smaller players that can process less complex orders with a 
faster turnaround time. 
 
Describe the current DNA synthesis security regime and how it was 
established.  A series of public incidents motivated the largest DNA synthesis 
companies to join together and establish a voluntary consortium.  However, not 
all companies joined this consortium and a handful of very large companies 
established their own consortium with similar standards.  The actions that led to 
industry and regulatory reflection and the creation of the two competing 
screening consortia are described in this chapter. 
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Describe existing U.S. and international frameworks for biological security.  
There are a series of existing international agreements that are designed to 
inhibit the production of dangerous biological pathogens.  These existing 
agreements include the United Nations Biological Weapons Convention, the 
Australia Group, and the United Nations Resolution 1540.  In addition, there are 
a series of U.S. guidelines established after the the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, and the 2001 Anthrax attacks that attempt to provide guidance to 
suppliers of synthetic DNA. 
 
Describe the dual use nature of DNA synthesis technologies in relation to 
other dual use technologies.  DNA synthesis is similar in many respects to 
other industries that have great benefits, but it can also be manipulated to serve 
militant and dangerous goals.  By comparing and contrasting DNA synthesis to 
these other technologies, we will be able to better predict where DNA synthesis 
technology may go in the future and study the effectiveness of security policies. 
 
Predict where DNA synthesis technology and the DNA synthesis industry 
are going.  In recent years, smaller and cheaper synthesizers gained speed and 
accuracy while decreasing costs.  This has led to the advent of the powerful 
desktop synthesizer.  This dispersion of synthesis ability will require further study 
on how more centralized regulatory policies will affect security in the DNA 
synthesis industry.  With the advancement of these technologies, some firms and 
laboratories are bringing their DNA synthesis in house.  This means that they will 
create the synthetic DNA themselves instead of sending orders to the large 
existing DNA synthesis companies.  This could be done for a number of reasons 
including projected cost savings and quality control (Miklos et al., 2012).  This 
chapter will provide an introduction to what these technological and industrial 
shifts may mean and how they will affect current and future security policies. 
 
Discuss the International Genetically Engineered Machine Competition 
(iGEM) as a case study in adaptive security management.  The iGEM 
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competition began with five U.S. based teams in 2003.  In 2013, it had 
participants from over 200 countries.  The competition is open source, and has 
devoted resources to its safety and security procedures and outreach programs.  
The iGEM Safety Committee has found gaps in the existing security structure, 
and has worked to address the gaps quickly and in an open manner.  iGEM’s 
Safety Committee’s recommendations serve as a case study to successful 
adaptation regarding safety and security gaps. 
 
Describe several policy recommendations and their possible implications.  
This thesis will conclude with several policy recommendations to mitigate the 
emerging security concerns in the international DNA synthesis industry.  This will 
include the use of the International Genetically Engineered Machine Competition 
as an example of a voluntary and international system that uses adaptive 
regulation in response to changing technology. 
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2. DNA Synthesis and DNA Synthesis Industry 
This chapter explores the development of DNA synthesis, focusing on the period 
since the 1980s where the merging of advanced synthesis techniques and 
computer aided design allowed for rapid advancement in the length and 
complexity of the synthesized DNA.  The decreasing costs and increasing 
abilities of DNA synthesis will be examined.  In addition, the DNA synthesis 
industry will be described with a focus on the development of the current system. 
 
2.1 Overview of DNA 
 “DNA is like a computer program but far, far more advanced than any software 
ever created.” – Bill Gates, co-creator of Microsoft 
 
DNA is a long, stable molecule in the form of a chain polymer.  It consists of four 
different units called nucleotides.  All four nucleotides have sugar and phosphate 
groups that are shown in the red boxes in Figure 2. The other part of the 
nucleotide structure, known as the base, is shown in the blue boxes in Figure 2.  
These bases are divided into two groups with two nucleotides in each group. The 
pyrimidines (thymine and cytosine) have one six-membered ring containing a 
nitrogen atom.  The other group called purines (adenine and guanine) has a 
double ring instead (Berg, et al., 2006).  These nucleotides line up as pairs: as 
shown in Figures 1 and 2, adenine (A) pairs with thymine (T), and cytosine (C) 
pairs with guanine (G).  Together, these groups form a ladder-like structure with 
the bases forming rungs on the inside and the sugar and phosphate groups 
forming the vertical shell on the outside. This ladder naturally twists, forming the 
double helix of DNA, as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: DNA Double Helix structure, (Nature Biotechnology, 2004) 
 
A six-membered-ring base always pairs with a double-ring base, so the spacing 
between the two strands of DNA is maintained throughout the length of the 
molecule, and the overall shape of the molecule is the same regardless of the 
sequence or the length (Berg et al., 2006).  In addition, the “frame” of the 
structure remains consistent.  This repeated pattern of sugar-phosphate groups 
(the red boxes in Figure 2) creates a uniformity that makes it possible to 
automate the synthesis of DNA.  Because of this constant frame, the chemical 
reaction required to combine the bases does not change. The DNA sequencing 
command then reduces to using the right nucleotide building blocks in the right 
order (Berg et al., 2006). 
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Figure 2: DNA structure is an example of the four bases forming a short single-stranded segment of 
DNA (Sanghvi, 2007) 
 
 
Figure 3: Base pairs create a double helix when chained (Sanghvi, 2007) 
 
 
2.2 History of DNA Synthesis 
The ideas underpinning DNA synthesis were formulated more than 150 years 
ago in Germany.  In 1869, Friedrich Miescher isolated nuclein from pus cells 
recovered from hospitals.  In 1889, Richard Altman purified nuclein by removing 
the proteins from the structure:  he called this product nucleic acid.  In 1900, 
Albrecht Kossel studied the chemical composition of nucleic acids and found that 
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they contained only four bases: adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine (Mohr, 
2013). 
 
In 1955, the first chemical synthesis of a DNA molecule was completed.  By 
1976, the longest reported synthesis of a DNA segment was only 126 base pairs 
long. This project took 8 years to complete.  Today, the same DNA segment can 
be made in minutes using an automated DNA synthesizer (Sanghvi, 2007). 
 
The first commercial DNA synthesizers were built and sold in the early 1980s by 
Applied Biosystems (Applied Biosystems, 2006).  They were simple devices that 
could construct one DNA sequence at a time on a very small scale. 
 
2.3 Creating a Desired DNA Sequence 
Today, the assembly of a desired sequence of DNA starts with the creation of 
what is termed an oligonucleotide or a “short oligo.”  An oligonucleotide is an 
assembly of several nucleotides into a medium length strand of DNA, generally 
less than twenty base pairs.  This process is done using automated solid-phase 
synthesis.  In this process, the chain of nucleotides is built on a bead, one by 
one, and washed in between each new nucleotide addition (Sanghvi, 2007). 
 
There are a number of instruments on the market that have the capability to 
produce hundreds or thousands of DNA sequences in parallel.4  The Applied 
Biosystems model 3900 DNA synthesizers can use 384-well plates, constructing 
a different sequence in each well (Springer, 2006).  Some companies have 
specialized further.  Illumina has adapted a well plate technique to create large 
synthesizers with many platforms, each carrying 384-well plates (Sanghvi, 2007).  
In addition to becoming faster and more powerful, modern synthesizers have 
become increasingly cheaper and more ubiquitous.  The advancement of DNA 
synthesizers is shown in Figure 4 where the Automated sequencers from 1985, 
                                            
4 This means many different strands of DNA can be constructed at the same 
time. 
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1997, 2005, and 2011 are shown side by side for comparison.  The number of 
DNA synthesizers available for purchase on eBay and other low cost websites 
shows the diffusion of technology due to this trend in increasing capabilities and 
falling costs (Madrigal, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 4: Applied Biosystems DNA synthesizers in 1985, 1997, 2005, and 2011 from left to right 
(Applied Biosystems, 2013) 
In addition to these available technologies, many companies are in the process 
of developing, patenting, and licensing new DNA synthesis technologies that are 
faster.  Gen9, based in Cambridge, MA, claims to be developing a DNA 
synthesis facility that will eventually have the same sequencing capacity as one-
third of the world’s current DNA synthesis capacity (Goldberg, 2013).  However, 
without seeing evidence of this sequence capacity, it is difficult to determine if 
this claim is an exaggeration. 
 
2.3.1 Rising Capabilities and Falling Costs 
Research by Rob Carlson, a biotechnology professor and biotechnology 
consultant, has shown that DNA sequencing technologies have been advancing 
at a rate that outperforms Moore’s Law.  Moore’s law states that processing 
power for computers will double roughly every two years at the same cost.  The 
parallel would be the ability of DNA synthesis to double every two years at the 
same cost.  The rapid advancement of DNA synthesis ability is shown in Figure 
5.  This is coupled with Figure 6, which shows the rapidly falling costs of 
synthesis. 
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 Figure 5 is a graph of DNA sequencing ability (Exponential scale on the Y-
axis) over time (X-axis).  Sequencing ability is shown in yellow.  Starting in 1990, 
it shows that the global DNA synthesis community’s ability to create synthetic 
DNA has grown exponentially since 1990.  The increase continues with the 
introduction of the Capillary sequencer in 1998 and the second-generation 
sequencers developed in 2005.  Rob Carlson stops the DNA synthesis estimate 
in 2008, citing that no new synthesizer technologies have been commercialized 
since then (Carlson, 2013).  The scale of the Y-axis in Figure 5 shows the 
number of base pairs that can be synthesized per worker per day. 
 
 
Figure 5: DNA synthesis capability over time (note the exponential scale on the Y-axis) (Carlson, 
2013) 
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Figure 6 shows the decrease in the cost of DNA synthesis, both in terms of short 
oligos (shown in red) and full-length genes (shown in yellow).  From this figure 
the costs of synthesizing DNA has dropped by more than two orders of 
magnitude in less than a decade.  Carlson predicts that DNA synthesis will 
change very soon, based on his personal conversations with industry players and 
based on the fact that the industry is using chemistry techniques that are several 
decades old (Carlson, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 6: Cost per base of DNA sequenced over time (note the exponential scale on the Y-axis) 
(Carlson, 2013) 
 
Carlson also predicts that breakthroughs in sequencing technology will not 
necessarily be followed by an increase in demand.  This is because there is 
currently little need for more synthetic DNA than maximum production.  Currently, 
synthetic circuits are simple and consist of a relatively small amount of DNA.  
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However, he states, “the market dynamics of biological technologies will remain 
difficult to predict precisely because of the diversity of technology and the 
difficulty of the tasks at hand.  We can plan on prices going down; how much, I 
wouldn't want to predict” (Carlson, 2013). 
 
2.4 The Current DNA Synthesis Industry 
“As the market for DNA on demand continues to grow, increases in the scale and 
efficiency of new genome engineering approaches promise to accelerate product 
discovery and even open up new commercial opportunities.” 
Mike May, writer for Nature Biotechnology 
 
The cost of DNA synthesis has dropped and the ability of large sequencers has 
increased over time.  However, due to reliability issues and general economies of 
scale, most DNA synthesis is carried out in large facilities that provide one or 
more services to the biological and biotechnology communities (Bugl et al., 
2007). 
 
The core of the DNA synthesis industry is generally separated into two groups 
that perform slightly different functions.  The first group consists of generally 
smaller companies that provide short fragments of DNA material using non-
proprietary techniques and tools.  These fragments are generally fewer than 200 
nucleotides in length.  These smaller sequences are used in research and are 
often combined further in laboratory settings.  The second group contains 
companies that provide longer fragments of DNA.  These DNA fragments are 
usually greater than 200 nucleotides in length and can code for whole genes and 
even the majority of DNA material coding for single celled organisms (many 
thousands of genes in length). 
 
As interconnected as these two groups are, they differ in terms of their maturity 
(Bugl et al., 2007).  The first group that specializes in short oligo production is 
considered a mature industry.  The process is fast and supplies a commodity 
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service to various (usually, local) markets.  The industry does this with low costs 
and delivers often in fewer than 48 hours (Bugl et al., 2007).  This industry is 
facing competition from small capacity desktop synthesizers that are now 
commonly found in academic labs and can be purchased online (Madrigal, 
2007).  However, many researchers will still order through these providers, as 
they are better able to exercise economies of scale.  The second group is a less 
mature industry.  Designing and constructing gene length sequences of DNA is 
still in its infancy when compared to short oligo construction.  The technological 
demands of gene length sequence construction increase the price of these 
sequences.  However, there is still a large demand for a number of gene length 
and greater constructs by large industrial consumers.  Many of these customers 
are large pharmaceutical companies (Bugl et al., 2007). 
 
An example of the development and spread of DNA synthesis technologies and 
capabilities is in China.  BGI (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute) runs more than 
100 of the most powerful DNA synthesizers available today (Callaway, 2011).  In 
addition, BGI runs 150 next generation sequencers.  Combining these 
technologies with other advanced tools (such as cloud computing) BGI is 
creating a “one stop shop” for DNA synthesis.  David Dooling, a bioinformatician 
at the Genome Institute at Washington University in St. Louis, thinks that BGI’s 
eventual creations of a tool to cover all stages of DNA synthesis makes sense as 
those who are working on gene research become less experienced as the 
technologies diffuse.  In addition to the creation of a “one stop shop” he thinks 
that vertical integration, or companies combining with each other at different 
stages of the production chain, will be one way that DNA synthesis firms continue 
to evolve (Callaway, 2011). 
 
2.5 Future Advances and their Security Implications 
This chapter provided general background knowledge about DNA, DNA 
synthesis, and its commercial industry.  In addition, it described the accelerating 
progress of DNA synthesis capabilities and how some researchers predict that 
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this trend will continue to accelerate.  This will greatly increase our ability to use 
automated DNA synthesis to create longer and more complex DNA sequences 
more rapidly.  At the same time, it is clear that the cost of producing these 
synthetic DNA sequences is quickly falling. 
 
The pace of advancement of DNA synthesis technologies makes it difficult for a 
static form of regulation to enhance security for any length of time.  At this point, 
how DNA synthesis technology will advance and who will be at the forefront are 
continually changing.  With this in mind, it would be more advantageous to have 
minimal government interference in the security regulation of DNA synthesis.  
This would allow industry and practitioners to have a stronger voice in how the 
security regime evolves and would enable speed, flexibility and rapid change.  In 
the long run, such a system will be more effective than rigid security mandates 
passed through government agencies.   
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3. Industrial Structure of the DNA Synthesis Industry 
Early DNA synthesis companies were located near Boston, MA and San 
Francisco, CA (Penhoet, 2013).  By the end of 2013, gene synthesis will be an 
estimated $2.4 billion global industry (May, 2009).  There are now dozens of 
gene synthesis companies that exist all over the world.  The world’s largest 
producer of custom synthetic DNA is currently Integrated DNA Technologies 
(Cevanaux, 2013).  In addition to the international diffusion of gene synthesis 
technology and companies producing synthetic DNA, there has been a 
separation in the industry itself. 
 
In 2010, the J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI) constructed a 1.08-mega base pair 
synthetic genome that contained more than one million bases.   It is the largest 
synthetic DNA construct created to date.  This synthetic genome was placed into 
a host cell that had its genetic material removed and created a viable cell.5  They 
constructed this synthetic genome6 with help from Blue Heron Biotechnologies 
(Gibson et al., 2010).  The construction took several years, and companies like 
JCVI and Blue Heron Biotechnologies developed new techniques to create the 
large genome. 
 
However, many labs do not need very large DNA constructs.  Instead, they need 
smaller constructs in a faster time frame than that offered by a large DNA 
synthesis company.  Labs often test the efficacy of smaller constructs to be sure 
they are functioning as designed, and then test these larger constructs for further 
research. 
 
                                            
5 A viable cell is a cell that functions as a life form.  It is capable of sustaining 
itself and replicating. 
6  All of the organism’s hereditary information, in this case the Mycoplasma 
mycoides genome, was inserted into the nucleus of a Mycoplasma capricolum 
cell (Gibson et al., 2010). 
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Small companies collect DNA orders for small oligonucleotides and can often 
deliver the orders overnight (McMurry, 2013).  This is much faster than the time it 
would take for a larger company, where it could be weeks. 
 
Figure 7 shows the globalization of the gene synthesis industry in 2007.  Western 
countries, India, China, Iran, South Africa, and others are expanding their gene 
synthesis ability.  The figure today looks similar, with additional consolidation of 
larger companies and a rise in smaller companies (Carlson, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 7: Commercial gene-synthesis providers, circa 2007 (Carlson, 2010) 
 
3.1 The Large Firms 
Larger players in the DNA synthesis industry compete with one another.  Even 
though the DNA synthesis technology and techniques have improved over the 
past few years, the assembly of large DNA circuits is still a technological 
challenge (Carlson, 2013). This challenge suggests that companies will gain 
advantage over one another by having newer, faster, and more accurate DNA 
synthesizers with larger capacity.  Larger players work with licensed and patent 
protected technologies. 
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A recent example of newer technology is the DNA synthesis technology under 
development by Gen9, based in Cambridge, MA.  The technology, know as 
BioFab, allows for very rapid and accurate construction of DNA material 
(Weintraub, 2012).  The company aims for a four-week turnaround time for large 
constructs (Goldberg, 2013).  This type of rapid technological advance leaves 
large firms at risk of being left behind by their competitors. 
 
3.2 The Small Firms 
Smaller players are able to survive due to the need for rapid turnaround times for 
smaller synthetic DNA constructs.  Companies and laboratories doing research 
on many different DNA constructs need multiple copies of a smaller construct 
(Gibson et al., 2010).  These buyers often prioritize rapid turnaround time over 
strict quality control, in order to test as many DNA sequences as possible 
(McMurry, 2013).  These companies coexist with the larger firms because many 
of the technologies and techniques that are used to construct smaller 
oligonucleotides are no longer under patent protection.  These technologies 
include techniques and technologies like PCR.  These smaller companies are 
able to work in local markets to provide rapid turnaround of shorter DNA 
sequences. 
 
3.3 New Firms and Sources of Synthetic DNA 
DNA synthesis technologies are rapidly advancing in capability, market 
placement, and geographic location. This means that today’s industrial structure 
may not be the same in ten years or even in five years.7  DNA synthesis 
companies are being created in U.S., Europe, and developing countries.  Many 
of them are being designed as national champions (where national resources are 
devoted to creating one large firm in the country to compete overseas) or using 
                                            
7 One theory is that the gene synthesis industry is transitory; the technology will 
become so cost effective and widespread that large companies will no longer be 
needed for their expertise (Carlson, 2009). 
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newly developed proprietary technologies that threaten to make older 
technologies obsolete in the industry.8 
 
An example of this phenomenon is Singapore focusing a large amount of 
resources toward establishing a high value biotechnology hub in South East Asia 
(Arnold, 2003).  The payoff of this government investment is currently unknown, 
and it may take years before Singapore gains a return on its investment.  
Currently, Singapore is struggling to fill many of the labs and offices it has 
constructed for biotechnology firms. 
 
3.3.1 BGI as an Example of a Country’s Champion 
Developing nations are devoting resources to build their own biotechnology 
sectors including funds for DNA synthesis technology development. 
 
China’s BGI (formerly the Beijing Genomics Institute) is currently one of the 
world’s largest DNA synthesis and sequencing firms.  BGI has already developed 
a name for itself internationally, and has been employed for several high profile 
sequencing and screening operations in China, including sequencing the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) genome (BGI, 2013).  Some U.S. officials 
are concerned that as BGI acquires other companies and collects more 
information, the knowledge might not be used properly (Abraham & Wheeler, 
2012).  The U.S. government first became concerned when BGI bought 128 
synthesizers from Illumina, based in San Diego.  At the time, these synthesizers 
were the most powerful in the world.  In 2012, BGI purchased the company, 
Complete Genomics of California.  This gave them access to over 30,000 whole 
human genomes (Flinn & Vance, 2012).  This is 10 times more than any other 
company.  This move by BGI also prevents the market for DNA synthesizers 
(where Illumina is a major player) from becoming even more concentrated. 
 
                                            
8 These include firms such as BGI in China or Gen9 in Cambridge, MA. 
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BGI is one of many DNA synthesis firms in emerging economies.  There are DNA 
synthesis companies scattered all over the world from Bioserve Biotechnologies 
in India to The Zilinski Institute in Russia (Carlson, 2011).  There are other 
entities in countries that the U.S. has limited official contact with, including Iran.  
In 2010, undergraduate students at the Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran 
requested to join the iGEM competition.  Due to U.S. export controls and possible 
scrutiny from the U.S. government, iGEM decided not to allow this team into the 
iGEM competition (Rettberg, 2012). 
 
3.3.2 Gen9’s Advances as an Example of Rapidly Changing Technology 
Gen9 is a company started and partially owned by three pioneers in genetic 
technologies and research: George Church, Joe Jacobson, and Drew Endy.  
Gen9 is already a member of the IGSC, and already screens their customers and 
their customer’s orders for dangerous sequences.  The company has not publicly 
released its technologies, but several patents have been granted and several 
more are on the way.  The company claims to have developed a chip-based 
technology that will increase the speed and accuracy of DNA synthesis.  They 
claim that the company’s new facility in Cambridge, MA will increase global DNA 
synthesis capacity by one third (Goldberg, 2013). 
 
3.4 University Laboratories 
In addition to companies, there are several hundred laboratories across the world 
that can construct synthetic DNA.  These facilities rarely construct genes for 
outside use, but we cannot rule out that such laboratories would not do so in the 
future (Maurer, et al., 2009). 
 
3.5 The Industry’s Reasons for Voluntarily Screening 
The DNA synthesis industry has become stratified by the size of the industry 
players.  Large firms compete with one another using proprietary tools and 
technology.  They are often able to operate with larger margins because they 
have the technology and expertise to create large DNA constructs (Carlson, 
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2009).  This contrasts with the smaller, localized firms who cater to a local 
clientele who know and trust them.  For smaller firms, their tools and techniques 
are not proprietary and their margins for each delivery are smaller than those of 
the larger firms.  Falling prices due to large firms’ economies of scale may drive 
small firms out of the market, but many small synthesis companies continue to 
survive in localized markets where turnaround time is key (Maurer et al., 2009). 
 
3.5.1 Customer Pressures 
Customers of synthetic DNA are concerned about price, which is evident in the 
competition between synthetic DNA providers to provide the highest quality DNA 
at lower prices than their competitors.  Even if screening only adds a small cost 
to each order, smaller firms may find it difficult to retain their customer base.  
Their customers can easily switch to another firm (with less rigorous screening 
procedures) or might even bring the work in-house.  This is less of a problem for 
larger firms, because it is easier for them to transfer the screening costs to their 
customers due to less competition stemming from proprietary technologies and 
techniques.  In addition, some substantial customers of the larger DNA synthesis 
firms expect good corporate governance from their suppliers.  AstraZeneca, a 
British pharmaceutical company, does not order synthetic DNA from suppliers 
that do not follow the ISAB or IGSC codes (AstraZeneca, 2008).  Such actions 
from the largest customers of DNA synthesis firms further encourages them to 
apply the voluntary standards. 
 
For customers in Asia, purchasing certain types of synthetic DNA from U.S. 
suppliers, can be difficult.  If a reputable company or researcher outside of the 
U.S. wishes to purchase a “dual-use gene,” a gene from an organism that is on 
an export control list, then the DNA synthesis company must license the order.  
This process itself can take up to eight weeks and can add a large cost to the 
order.  This system is likely to encourage buyers outside of the U.S. and EU to 
purchase their synthetic DNA in their own countries even if the price is higher, 
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quality is lower, or the screening methods are not as rigorous (Maurer et al., 
2009). 
 
3.5.2 Legal Liability 
Currently, large firms are using the voluntary screening consortia, and their use is 
encouraging newer and smaller companies to join as well.  Some of these firms 
are motivated by the fear of legal liability.  If a company’s product is used in a 
weapon, attempted attack, or even an accident by an untrained scientist, the 
company may be found legally liable.  Firms are likely to join a voluntary best 
practices regime if they receive legal protection. 
 
Customer confidentiality is another issue.  Customers who have a strong interest 
in the intellectual property of their DNA sequences will likely be concerned about 
having a third party screen and synthesize their work.  In addition to the 
screening and synthesis, many companies might be concerned that their DNA 
sequence orders are also being stored for eight years (see IGSC Harmonized 
Screening Protocol in Appendix B). 
 
3.6 Drawbacks of the Voluntary System 
The structure of the DNA synthesis industry makes traditional regulation difficult.  
In addition to stifling an emerging industry, regulation would likely be marginally 
effective.  Hard rules would put firms that operate on thin margins out of 
business, and expensive export controls encourage overseas customers to use 
overseas providers, who might not use proper screening.  Even if only a small 
handful of firms provide synthetic DNA without screening, the whole system is at 
risk.  Nefarious actors could simply use a supplier who does not screen orders. 
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4. Construction of the Current DNA Synthesis Regime 
This chapter seeks to describe the current DNA synthesis security regime and 
how it was established.  It begins by describing the first conference on 
recombinant DNA ethics and safety, the Asilomar conference in 1975.  It then 
describes a series of experiments and public mishaps that motivated the largest 
DNA synthesis companies to establish the International Association of Synthetic 
Biology (IASB), a voluntary consortium.  However, not all companies joined this 
consortium, and several large companies established their own consortium with 
similar standards, the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC). 
 
4.1 The Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA 
The framework that guides the new DNA synthesis industry consists of many of 
the concepts and ideas from the influential 1975 Asilomar Conference on 
Recombinant DNA (Bugl et al., 2007).  This conference was designed to ensure 
safety and public participation in DNA research.  However, the conference and 
resulting framework were not designed to deal with the intentional misapplication 
of DNA.  Also, this conference was held several years before the advent of PCR 
and the growth of the DNA synthesis industry. The conference also suggested 
that, “work on construction of recombinant DNA molecules should proceed 
provided that appropriate safeguards, principally biological and physical barriers 
adequate to contain the newly created organisms, are employed.  Moreover, the 
standards of protection should be greater at the beginning and modified as 
improvements in the methodology occur and assessments of the risks change.” 
(Berg et al., 1975).  However, it should be noted that the Asilomar Conference 
did not focus on security in recombinant DNA research, but on the general risks 
and implications of recombinant DNA technology. 
 
4.2 Examples of Security Gaps 
Industries will often voluntarily respond to problems (or what the public perceives 
as problems) to avoid strong regulation by the government (Oye, 2012).  The 
DNA synthesis industry has behaved in a similar way.  The voluntary consortia 
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formed in the aftermath of several unforeseen and potentially dangerous events 
and the negative reaction of the public. 
 
4.2.1 Mouse Pox and 100% Lethality 
In 2001, researchers in Australia attempted to create a virus that would sterilize 
mice (You, 2011).  The experiment had legitimate scientific use: during large 
grain harvests in Australia, there is often an accompanying “mouse plague” of 
mice feeding on the grain.  The goal of the experiment was to create a virus that 
could be rapidly and easily transmitted among the mice, and would cause sterility 
leading to a crash in the mouse population.  This would quickly and effectively 
end the mouse plague.  The experiment was supposed to be quite simple and 
was meant to work by slightly modifying an existing virus, mousepox.  This virus 
is similar to a version that can be lethal in humans, smallpox.  The World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared that smallpox was eradicated in 1980 (Henderson, 
1998).  The research team modified the mousepox genome with a simple 
receptor, used quite often in genetic research, called interleukin-4 (Jackson et al., 
2001). 
 
The results obtained by the study surprised the researchers.  Not only did this 
slight modification to the mousepox genome make the virus very deadly to non-
inoculated9 mice, but it also resulted in a 100% mortality rate for mice that had 
been inoculated against mousepox (Jackson et al., 2001). The research team 
published the results, including the methods for the modification of the mousepox 
genome.  This type of method reporting is done in almost all scientific studies, so 
that other research teams can confirm the findings.  However, many experts in 
security policy were concerned that such an experiment could be repeated on 
smallpox or another dangerous pathogen (You, 2011). 
 
While the creation of the mousepox virus does not deal directly with DNA 
synthesis or its associated technologies, the episode did show the biological 
                                            
9 Mice that had not been given an immunization to the mousepox virus. 
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security community that dangerous pathogens could potentially be created, even 
by accident. 
 
4.2.2 Reconstruction of Polio 
In 2002, researchers at the State University of New York at Stony Brook 
published how to reconstruct the poliovirus, which had been eliminated in the 
U.S. for several decades (Samuel et al., 2009).  Much of the work done in 2002 
was based on an earlier study by Sarnow, Berstein, and Baltimore in 1986.  In 
that study a pathogenic portion of the poliovirus was inserted into a genome and 
replicated (Sarnow et al., 1986).  The most important issue raised during the 
research was that “the results show that it is possible to synthesize an infectious 
agent by in vitro chemical-biochemical means solely by following instructions 
from a written sequence” (Cello et al., 2002).  This study was considered an 
advancement in the current global campaign to eliminate polio.  As with the 
mousepox study, security policy experts also saw the ability to resurrect or 
construct dangerous human pathogens.  Unlike the mousepox study, poliovirus 
DNA was sequenced and synthesized on purpose. 
 
4.2.3 Reconstruction of the Spanish Flu 
In 2005, researchers reconstructed the influenza virus that was responsible for 
over 50 million deaths worldwide and almost 700,000 in the U.S. alone in the 
early 1900s (Samuel et al., 2009).  This influenza strain was unique in its lethality 
to young adults, aged 15-34 year olds (Tumpey et al., 2005).  The researchers 
recovered lung tissues from a victim of the virus that had been frozen for nearly a 
century in the Alaskan permafrost (Tumpey et al., 2005).  This study was 
undertaken in order to ascertain the virulence of this influenza strain and to make 
a direct comparison to the modern H1N1 and H3N2 influenza viruses. 
 
4.2.4 The Guardian Smallpox Story 
In 2006, a reporter for UK’s publication, The Guardian, managed to order part of 
the Smallpox genome from a synthetic DNA provider.  He ordered the sequence 
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online for about $40.00 and it was successfully delivered to his home 
(Randerson, 2006).  His article described how easy it was to order synthetic DNA 
of any sequence and that there was no effort made to screen the order or 
customer. 
 
This was a clear indication of how easy it is for someone with a basic 
understanding of DNA synthesis to acquire potentially dangerous synthetic DNA.  
The DNA ordered by The Guardian was not dangerous by itself, but with the right 
set of tools and knowledge, it could have created an organism similar to 
smallpox. 
 
4.3 Creation of the Voluntary Screening Consortia 
The following sections are heavily reliant on the extensive work of the late 
Jonathan B. Tucker. 
 
From the beginning, some synthetic DNA suppliers realized the dangers 
associated with their work and its dual use nature.  Blue Heron Biotechnology, 
founded in 2001, was one of the original companies working in this area (Blue 
Heron Biotechnology, 2013).  At first, the company screened customers just to 
verify that they were actual researchers or industry users.  After September 11, 
2001 and the anthrax letter attacks, Blue Heron began to develop and deploy a 
“second line of defense” by screening the DNA orders as well (Tucker, 2010). 
 
As part of this effort, Blue Heron used a software package called Blackwatch, 
developed by Craic Computing in Seattle, WA (Tucker, 2010).  It used a set of 
algorithms to compare incoming synthesis orders against a database of DNA 
sequences of known pathogens.10  If an order had a very close match to a 
genetic sequence in the database, the program flagged the order as a “hit.”  If a 
hit is recorded, then a human expert employed by the company assessed the risk 
associated with the sequence.  Additionally, the human expert checked the 
                                            
10 Viruses and bacteria that cause infectious disease. 
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customer’s identity, verified a legitimate end use, and confirmed responses to 
biosafety and biosecurity questions (Tucker, 2010).   
 
To this date, many pathogenic sequences were detected, but malicious intent 
was never found.  The orders that go through additional screening are almost 
always ordered for testing and development of new vaccines or basic research 
(Tucker, 2010).  Craic Computing is now developing an improved version of 
Blackwatch, called Safeguard, that is designed to more accurately spot 
pathogenic sequences, but less likely to raise a false positive hit cause by 
“housekeeping genes” that exist in both pathogenic and nonpathogenic 
sequences (Hayden, 2009). 
 
False positives are a concerning issue with the current DNA consortia.  These 
false positives add to the cost of screening because a human screener needs to 
ensure that each “hit” is not just part of a nonpathogenic gene that has a similar 
sequence to a pathogenic one.  A false negative is even more dangerous and 
involves the screening software allowing a potentially dangerous genetic 
sequence to move forward without additional safety assessment. 
 
By 2005, many companies were voluntarily screening their customers and 
orders, but the methodology varied from company to company and a few firms 
resisted entirely.  In 2006, seven of the leading gene-synthesis companies, listed 
in Table 1, formed the International Consortium for Polynucleotide Synthesis to 
promote safety and security (Tucker, 2010). 
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Table 1: Locations of seven DNA synthesis companies associated with the International Consortium 
for Polynucleotide Synthesis (Tucker, 2010) 
Company Location 
Blue Heron Biotechnology United States 
GENEART Germany 
Codon Devices (closed in 2009) United States 
Coda Genomics United States 
BaseClear The Netherlands 
Bioneer Republic of Korea 
Integrated DNA Technologies United States 
 
The seven firms worked with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on a 
small pilot project called the Synthetic Biology Tripwire Initiative (Tucker, 2010).  
The project resulted in a mechanism for participating companies to contact the 
FBI if they saw suspicious orders.  One of the major drawbacks with the tripwire 
system was its reliance on volunteer labor that was supplied by the participating 
companies.  Over several years, the Tripwire Initiative slowly became inactive. 
 
During this time, a group of five German companies, listed in Table 2, formed 
another consortium called the International Association of Synthetic Biology 
(IASB).  In 2008, the IASB held a workshop in Munich that gathered DNA 
synthesis experts from Europe and the U.S. to discuss creating a uniform “code 
of conduct” for screening customers and orders (Tucker, 2010).  This code of 
conduct would be based on the best practices currently used by several leading 
DNA synthesis companies. 
Table 2: Five original companies in the IASB (Tucker, 2010) 
Company 
ATG:biosynthetics 
Biomax Informatics 
Entelechon 
Febit Holding 
Sloning BioTechnology 
 
Major ideas emerged from the conference, including that biosecurity in DNA 
synthesis should not be an area of competition between firms and that all firms 
would benefit from a secure DNA synthesis industry.  The companies pledged to 
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share resources in developing a mutually beneficial screening system that would 
also create a level playing field for screening.  A draft called the “Code of 
Conduct for Best Practices in Gene Synthesis” was submitted for comment in 
late 2008 (Tucker, 2010). 
 
However, by 2009 a split emerged within the industry over the role of human 
experts in the screening process (Fischer & Maurer, 2010).  The two largest 
suppliers of synthetic genes (DNA2.0 and GENEART) wanted to eventually 
replace human experts with a completely automated system that would screen 
orders against a regularly updated list of virulence-related sequences (Hayden, 
2009).  The rationale was that the automated system would be faster and 
cheaper to implement.  This proposal was met with resistance from other 
participants because it was less capable than existing screening methods.  Both 
DNA2.0 and GENEART continued to pursue a separate code of conduct and 
held closed door meetings with other large gene-synthesis providers (Hayden, 
2009). 
 
A second IASB workshop was held in late 2009.  Companies at the workshop 
reached a consensus on a basic set of guidelines, but the details were delegated 
to a Technical Expert Group on Biosecurity. All five members of the IASB 
endorsed the code and the first non-IASB company (Generay Biotech in 
Shanghai) adopted it soon after.  However, several leading firms declined to sign 
onto the IASB code because they did not feel secure with giving so much power 
to a group of experts that did not report to the firms (Tucker, 2010). 
 
The IASB system allows firms to adopt and comply with the IASB Code of 
Conduct and receive a “seal of approval” that can be publicly displayed, as 
shown in Figure 8.  This seal is designed to give companies a competitive 
advantage because it identifies them as reputable suppliers who screen their 
orders.  In order to prove its effectiveness, the IASB plans to certify members on 
an annual basis.  Through “red team” strategies that involve sending fake orders 
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containing dangerous sequences to test their screening procedures (Maurer et 
al., 2009).  This strategy has had some payoff for the IASB as some large 
customers have concluded that DNA synthesis screening is in their best business 
interest. 
 
 
Figure 8: IASB seal of approval (IASB, 2013) 
 
Several weeks after the IASB code of conduct was finalized, five of the leading 
gene synthesis companies, listed in Table 3, announced the formation of another 
separate industry group, the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC). 
The IGSC also launched their own code of conduct called the “Harmonized 
Screening Protocol for Gene Sequence and Customer Screening to Promote 
Biosecurity” (Tucker, 2010).  See Appendix 2 for the IGSC Harmonized 
Screening Protocol. 
 
Table 3: Original members of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) (Tucker, 2010) 
Company 
GENEART 
DNA2.0 
Blue Heron Biotechnology 
Integrated DNA Technologies (IDT) 
GenScript 
 
The IGSC screening protocol says that companies should “screen the complete 
DNA sequence of every synthetic gene order…against all entities found in one or 
more of the internationally coordinated sequence reference databanks” (Tucker, 
2010).  Whenever a sequence is associated with pathogenicity is identified, it will 
  41 
receive further screening from a human expert, including stronger customer 
screening.  The IGSC members developed a Regulated Pathogen Database that 
includes all gene sequences identified as potentially hazardous in several 
existing national lists, including the U.S. Select Agent List listed in Appendix 4 
and the Core Control List from the Australia Group listed in Appendix 3.  If an 
ordered sequence raises suspicion and the customer cannot confirm their 
legitimacy in working with the dangerous sequence, members of the IGCS will 
notify the FBI or another law enforcement agency.  The members of the IGSC 
will keep all customer, order, and screening records for at least eight years 
(IGSC Harmonized Screening Protocol, Appendix 2). 
 
Even though the reason for the schism between the IASB and the IGSC is the 
use of human screeners in the process (The IASB wanted them, the IGSC did 
not), both consortia were developed when no system existed that could have 
removed human screeners from the process.  To this day, both the IASB and the 
IGSC use human screeners to check orders that are flagged as potentially 
dangerous.  It is possible that the issue of using humans in the screening 
process was not the main concern of the companies that went on to form the 
IGSC. 
 
The IASB Code of Conduct and the IGSC Harmonized Screening Protocol are 
functionally similar.  The main difference between the two standards is their 
development process.  The IASB Code of Conduct was developed in an open 
atmosphere with all of the firms that wished to participate.  In contrast, the IGSC 
Harmonized Screening Protocol was developed behind closed doors and 
developed by a self-selected group limited to suppliers with the largest market 
share at the time (Tucker, 2010).  Although the IGSC wants all gene-synthesis 
providers to use its standards, only member companies will influence how the 
screening system will evolve in the future.  Figure 9 shows an example flow chart 
for an order for synthetic DNA for Life Technology, an IGSC member. 
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Figure 9: Life Technologies' biosafety and biosecurity screening practice for its gene synthesis 
orders (Notka et al., 2011) 
 
4.4 Future Development of the Voluntary Screening Consortia 
The two DNA Screening Consortia did not evolve in a vacuum.  They developed 
in response to unique external stimuli mentioned in section 4.2, along with other 
pressures.  However, even with a majority of the industry participants in 
agreement that a system must be established to ensure security, a single system 
did not develop.  The IGSC and the IASB have different long-term goals for using 
human screeners in their processes.  Currently, the screening technologies are 
not advanced enough that humans can safely be removed, but as quickly as 
automated screening technology is advancing, it may come to pass in the future. 
 
In addition to the two screening consortia, the company Synthetic Genomics has 
constructed a proprietary tool called Archetype that brings together design, 
construction, and sequence security for clients seeking synthetic DNA.  This tool 
could have a large impact on the current screening consortia and the industrial 
structure of the DNA synthesis industry.  Archetype is designed to allow a one 
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stop shop for customers and would let them bypass a separate design stage for 
their DNA constructs.  The customers would then outsource this to Synthetic 
Genomics where the customer could have Synthetic Genomics construct the 
DNA as well. 
 
The current DNA synthesis industry has put effort into mitigating the security 
risks posed by DNA synthesis technologies.  However, the current security 
regime is unstable (Fischer & Maurer, 2010; Goldberg, 2013).  It is unlikely that 
the industry will continue to exist with two separate and distinct consortia (the 
IASB and the IGSC).  In addition, each company in either consortium agrees to 
use the guidelines laid down in the agreement, but each company can enforce 
these guidelines in its own way.  This means that each company may be using 
different techniques to screen its sequences and customers.  Along with the two 
consortia, there are the voluntary guidelines published by the U.S. government in 
the Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded 
DNA, (2010) and described in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
 
As the consortia now exist, the only substantive difference between the IASB and 
the IGSC is openness (Fischer & Maurer, 2010).  The IGSC limits its 
membership by market share; it seems unwise and unfair to not allow smaller 
DNA synthesis firms to have influence in the standard setting process.  In 
addition, the rapid advancement of DNA synthesis technology means that these 
smaller firms might be tomorrow’s powerhouses. 
 
In addition, firms will need to think logically and creatively about how to screen 
customers for those very rare orders that do contain a pathogenic sequence.  
What happens if it is a legitimate researcher associated with a smaller start-up 
company?  What about the use of public databases of researchers and their 
credentials that is subject to fraud? (Fischer & Maurer, 2010).  How will 
companies handle orders such as these?  In addition, firms might cooperate and 
set up an open exchange system for certain repeat sequences and customers to 
  44 
ensure that the same enhanced screening is not conducted several times.  
However, firms with proprietary information might not want their data to be stored 
on a more open database. 
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5. Current U.S. and International Biological Security 
Measures 
The international community has several agreements in place that broadly deal 
with biological security.  Synthetic DNA and DNA synthesis are not explicitly 
mentioned in many of these agreements, but they are generally covered due to 
their dual use nature. In addition, the U.S. has its own laws and regulations 
dealing with dangerous or potentially dangerous biological technology, including 
recent guidance for producers of double stranded synthetic DNA. 
 
5.1 International Treaties and Agreements 
Several international treaties and agreements have been created since the early 
1970s to increase the difficulty of acquiring and using biological weapons.  These 
agreements include the United Nations Biological Weapons Convention 
(UNBWC) established in 1975, the Australia Group established in 1985, and the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 adopted in 2004. 
 
5.1.1 United Nations Biological Weapons Convention 
The Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and Their 
Destruction entered into force on March 26, 1975.  By mid-2005, over 173 
nations had signed the convention, while 23 nations did not sign (Lennane, 
2011).  The convention was designed to supplement the Geneva Protocol of 
1925 that had  prohibited only the use of chemical and biological weapons during 
the First World War (Findlay & Woodward, 2004). 
 
Article I states that signatories shall not “develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise 
acquire or retain…Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever the 
origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes…Weapons, equipment or 
means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or 
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in armed conflict” (Leannane, 2011. p. 45).  In addition, the convention requires 
signatories to destroy existing biological agents and toxins, and prohibits transfer 
to others, which could transfer or develop dangerous substances.  Figure 10 
shows nations that are members of the BWC in blue, and nonmembers in grey. 
 
 
Figure 10: Countries that have signed and ratified the Biological Weapons Convention, in blue 
(Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 2013) 
 
5.1.2 The Australia Group 
In response to the use of chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran war, fifteen countries 
created the Australia Group in 1985.  Its goal was to prevent countries from 
acquiring materials to produce chemical weapons through what seemed like 
legitimate trade channels.  The Australia group proposed to harmonize export 
controls among its participating members.  The Australia Group is an informal 
group that has no legally binding obligations to each other.  All members of the 
Australia Group are also members of the UN Biological Weapons Convention 
(see section 5.1.1 above).   
 
The Australia Group has grown to over 40 members and developed “common 
control lists” of materials and technologies that could slow the spread of chemical 
and biological weapons.  These restrictions are enforced through the licensing of 
chemical and biological agents and, most importantly for DNA synthesis, dual-
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use chemical and biological manufacturing equipment (The Australia Group, 
2007).  The biological agents (listed on the Core Control List in Appendix 3) 
include a range of bacteria, fungi, and viruses that are harmful to human health.  
In addition, the Core Control List states that pathogenic parts derived from any of 
the listed organisms are also under regulation (Pei, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 11: Country map of Australia Group members (Australia Group, 2013) 
 
5.1.3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 
The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 on April 28, 
2004 (1540 Committee, 2004).  Their goal was to create an effective global 
response to the threat posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by 
strengthening global non-proliferation activities.  The resolution forbids states 
from helping non-state actors that seek to develop chemical, biological, or 
nuclear technologies.  The resolution also establishes that mandatory domestic 
control measures be implemented in all nations in order to prevent weapons 
proliferation.  States are required to develop and maintain effective physical 
measures, border control, export control laws, and enforcement mechanisms 
(1540 Committee, 2004). 
 
  48 
5.2 U.S. Rules and Regulations 
In addition to being a part of the international agreements listed in section 5.1, 
the U.S. has its own set of rules and guidelines to combat possible biological 
threats. These rules have been strengthened since the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks and the 2001 Anthrax attacks. 
 
5.2.1 National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats 
The National Security Council published the National Strategy for Countering 
Biological Threats in November 2009.  It argues that rapid advances in the life 
sciences hold incredible potential for beneficial civilian progress, but could also 
be used by nefarious actors for harmful purposes.  It cites the decreasing barriers 
of cost and technological knowledge as a central problem, especially with the 
proliferation of severe threats from small terrorist groups or individuals (National 
Security Council, 2009). 
 
It calls for broad government action to address novel threats and suggests new 
norms for conduct, including insight on current and emerging risks, and 
reasonable steps to increase international dialogue on potential biological 
threats.  The report does not assign direct responsibilities, but it does describe 
specific actions that federal agencies should take (National Security Council, 
2009). 
 
5.2.2 Export Administration Regulations 
The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) was created in order to implement 
the Export Administration Act passed in 1979.  This Act gave the President of the 
United States the legal authority to control U.S. exports to protect national 
security and enforce foreign policy, especially if the material was in short 
domestic supply.  The EAR is implemented by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (Title 15, chapter VII, subchapter C of the U.S. Code).  The 
Commerce Control List contains the specific items that are subject to export 
controls.  Category 1 of this list contains “Materials, Chemicals, Microorganisms 
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and Toxins” and this is where dual-use biological items and equipment are 
specified. 
 
The Commerce Control List includes a number of viruses, bacteria, toxins and 
fungi that could cause disease in humans, animals, and plants.  It also includes 
genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences known to be associated 
with pathogenicity of any organism on the control list.  This is much like the 
Australia Group’s Guidelines.  The most restricted destinations include 
embargoed countries and those supporting terrorist activities (US Department of 
Commerce, 2010). 
 
Table 4: List of countries under U.S. embargo (Department of Commerce, 2010) 
Country 
Cuba 
Iran 
North Korea 
Northern Sudan 
Syria 
Sudan 
 
5.2.3 Select Agent Regulations 
In 2005, The Select Agent Regulations were endorsed to implement the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.  
Congress passed this act in response to the September 11 and 2001 Anthrax 
attacks to "improve the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare for and 
respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies."  The Act requires 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish and regulate a 
list of biological agents and toxins that pose a severe threat to public health 
(Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, 
2002). 
 
HHS controls the Select Agents Regulations through the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) under regulation 42 §73 Select Agents and Toxins 
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(Gonder, 2005).  This gives the CDC authority to monitor and control the use and 
transfer of these select agents and toxins.  Examples of these organisms include 
the Ebola virus, Yersinia pestis (causative agent of plague), and Bacillus 
Anthracis (the causative agent of anthrax).  The regulation controls: 
• all work that involves genetically modified versions of any organism on the 
select agents list 
• nucleic acids that can produce the infectious forms of any of the select 
agents’ viruses 
• nucleic acids that encode for the functional forms of the toxins in vivo or 
vitro. 
For the Select Agents and Toxins list see Appendix 4. 
 
5.3 The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity 
The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) was created to 
advise the federal government regarding technologies in the life sciences with 
dual use potential.  In addition, “the NSABB advises on and recommends specific 
strategies for the efficient and effective oversight of federally conducted or 
supported dual use biological research, taking into consideration national security 
concerns and the needs of the research community.” (National Institutes of 
Health, 2013). 
 
In 2006, the NSABB developed its own set of guidelines for commercial gene 
synthesis.  The recommendation attempted to “develop and promote standards 
and preferred practices for screening gene-synthesis orders and require that 
orders be screened by providers” (Shea, 2006).  The White House responded in 
2007 by convening an interagency working group to develop biosecurity 
guidelines for the U.S. gene synthesis industry.  The NSABB called for legally 
binding regulations, but the interagency working group created voluntary 
guidelines and tested them for several years to view their effectiveness 
(Wadman, 2009).  The government supported this approach because it did not 
impede legitimate scientific research and did not put U.S. companies at a 
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disadvantage relative to international competitors (Tucker, 2010).  Another 
reason for the lack of binding regulations was that regulations are best suited for 
static situations, while gene synthesis is a new and rapidly evolving field. 
 
There was no formal coordination between industry and government; however, 
enough discussion occurred to ensure that the efforts were not drastically 
different.  In 2009, the government published a draft of guidelines named 
Screening Framework Guidance for Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA Providers.  
The guidelines called for the screening of new customers and orders for double-
stranded DNA longer than 200 nucleotides (Eisenstein, 2010).  The screening 
involved confirmation of the purchaser’s identity and institutional affiliation.  
Suppliers must also look for “red flags” that suggest illicit activity, such as the use 
of a post office box instead of a street address (Screening Framework Guidance 
for Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA Providers, 2009).  One issue that remains 
unresolved is whether gene-synthesis companies should supply synthetic DNA to 
researchers who lack an institutional affiliation, such as hobbyists working in 
home laboratories or small start-up companies (Tucker, 2010). 
 
The main difference between the U.S. government guidelines and the two 
existing industry standards is the method for screening the gene orders.  In the 
U.S. guidelines, companies must use a “best match” algorithm that flags an order 
if it is more closely associated with a pathogenic gene than a non-pathogenic 
one.  This contrasts with the current industry standard that has a human inspect 
every order resembling a pathogen or toxin found in the U.S. government’s 
GenBank (Fischer & Maurer, 2010).  Fischer has suggested that these lesser 
guidelines could lead to a “race to the bottom,” where companies would fight for 
market share by lowering prices through less screening (Hayden, 2009).  In 
2013, this prediction has yet to pass, even though no stricter non-voluntary 
standards have come into force. 
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In early 2010, the Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy at the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) held a workshop 
to discuss several of the guidelines suggested by the government in its screening 
framework guidance.  First, the 200-nucleotide cutoff for screening was arbitrary 
and hard to justify.  It was suggested instead that screening should be done on 
any DNA, regardless of the length (Tucker, 2010).  Second, critics argued that 
the “best match” algorithm may be simple and easy to implement, but it is weaker 
than the current industry standards because it cannot detect pathogens that are 
not on the U.S. Select Agent List.11  The consensus of the AAAS workshop was 
that there is a need to capture a larger group of sequences of concern.  Static 
defenses such as the Select Agent List are easily beaten, and the marginal cost 
of screening pathogens outside the list is low (Tucker, 2010). 
 
At the workshop, one participant warned that “if the U.S. government endorses 
the Best Match algorithm, companies that have argued in the past for fast and 
cheap screening methods will almost certainly embrace this approach.  In that 
case, other firms will follow suit to remain competitive, moving the industry 
toward a screening standard that is less capable than what is already practiced 
by most companies today” (Hayden, 2009).  In addition, some participants 
argued that the screening software should be open source so that it would be 
quickly updated and validated as our understanding grows.  This is in 
comparison to proprietary software that tends to be more static (Tucker, 2010). 
 
5.4 Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic 
Double-Stranded DNA 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services published Screening 
Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA in 
October of 2010.  An important point is that this guidance is voluntary.  However, 
it shows how the federal government might aim to limit security risks associated 
with synthetic DNA production. 
                                            
11 Examples include SARS or other recently emerged viruses. 
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Providers of synthetic, double-stranded DNA have two responsibilities under this 
guidance.  First, they must establish whom they are distributing their product to.   
Second, they should know when their product contains a “sequence of 
concern.”12 
 
In the Guidance, DNA providers are asked to conduct customer and sequence 
screening processes for their orders. The purpose of the customer screening is 
to establish the legitimacy of customers ordering synthetic double-stranded DNA 
sequences by verifying the identity and affiliation of customers and identifying 
any “red flags” that would arise when there is suspicion that the order could be 
used inappropriately. The Guidance also recommends that providers check the 
customer against several lists of proscribed entities, such as the Department of 
the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control List of Specifically Designated 
Nationals and Blocked Persons, and the Department of Commerce Denied 
Persons List for domestic orders.  Lastly, the providers are required to follow the 
laws and regulations of U.S. trade sanctions and export controls for international 
orders. 
 
Sequence screening identifies whether sequences of concern are ordered.  If the 
complete sequence or unique parts of the sequences are identified, providers 
must make sure that customers have a Certificate of Registration from CDC for 
using select agents or toxins. For international orders, providers also screen for 
items on the Commerce Control List to ensure that they are in compliance with 
the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). 
 
If either the customer or sequence screening causes concern, a follow-up 
screening must take place to verify the legitimacy of the customer and end-use of 
the double-stranded DNA order.  This follow-up screening has less guidance and 
                                            
12 Defined as sequences that code for the select agents and toxins identified by 
CDC in the Select Agent Regulations 
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is less specific than for the initial screenings.  The customer’s identity, affiliation, 
legitimacy, and intended use are obtained.  If the follow-up screening does not 
solve the concerns raised, the provider contacts the FBI, the Select Agent 
Programs of CDC, or the Department of Commerce, for assistance and guidance 
on further action. 
 
One issue that was raised between industry and the NSABB was that the 
mandatory process could deter innovation in a new field.  However, the 
Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded 
DNA was created in consultation with industry.  Jessica Tucker, one of the main 
authors of the framework, does not think these standards will impede scientific 
advancement, because they were developed with the input of industry (Wadman, 
2009). 
 
5.5 Moving Forward 
The analysis in sections 5.2 thru 5.3 demonstrate that the U.S. government and 
the international community have both taken the threat of biological weapons and 
possible biological terrorism seriously.  Only recently has the government 
suggested methods to reduce possible dangers stemming specifically from 
synthetic DNA technologies.  These are still only voluntary guidelines and it is up 
to each individual synthesis company to decide what screening regulations to 
follow.  However, if a DNA synthesis company ships the genetic material coding 
a whole or partial pathogenic organism, the company could be charged under the 
EAR.  Therefore, there is a strong incentive to ensure that dangerous pathogenic 
parts are not shipped, customers’ identities are known, and their credentials are 
verified.  In addition, all companies know that if any synthetic DNA sequence is 
used to damage human health or the environment, the entire industry will be 
scrutinized.  Such an event might lead to hasty and overzealous responses by 
politicians and regulators that could seriously weaken the industry. 
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Fischer & Maurer (2009) have published that without hard and fast guidelines to 
which  companies must adhere, there would be a “race to the bottom” between 
DNA synthesis companies as they competed with one another in price and 
brought prices down through less screening (Hayden, 2009).  However, both the 
IASB and the IGSC continue to exist and continue to hold their companies to 
standards when screening orders.  In addition, Michael Imperiale, a professor of 
microbiology and immunology at the University of Michigan Medical School, 
states that the U.S. government guidelines are not necessarily less than what the 
IASB and the IGSC have come up with on their own (Wadman, 2009). 
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6. A Comparison with Other Technologies and 
Industries 
A dual use technology is a technology that is used for a legitimate and useful 
civilian purpose (i.e., biotechnologies) but can easily be converted for nefarious 
purposes (i.e., a biological weapon).  DNA synthesis is considered a dual use 
technology.  There are several other notable examples of dual use technologies 
that will be discussed in this chapter.  In addition, this chapter compares DNA 
synthesis with other dual use technologies. 
 
6.1 Dual Use Technology: Nuclear 
Enriched or reprocessed fissile materials (most commonly Uranium or Plutonium) 
can be used to power a nuclear power plant or a nuclear bomb.  Natural Uranium 
ore consists of several isotopes of Uranium.13 U-235 is the radioactive isotope, 
and its nuclear decay can power nuclear reactions.  Natural Uranium contains 
only about 0.72% Uranium 235 (Tobey, 2012).  When enriched to only 3%-5%, 
U-235 can be used as fuel in a nuclear reactor.  If that same Uranium is enriched 
to more than 90%, U-235 can be used in a nuclear bomb.  Uranium enrichment 
technologies are internationally available, but they are controlled by international 
agreements.  These agreements were designed to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, while encouraging the growth of a peaceful nuclear industry for 
power generation. 
 
6.1.1 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was established in 1968 and came 
into force in 1970 (NPT, 2013).  It divides all members into two separate and 
distinct groups.  First, there are nuclear weapon states, which are the countries 
that detonated a nuclear explosion prior to January 1, 1967.  Second are all other 
members, the non-nuclear-weapon states (Cirincione et al., 2005). 
                                            
13  An isotope is the same element with very similar physical and chemical 
properties, but the differing number of neutrons leads to a different atomic mass. 
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Under the NPT, non-nuclear weapons states pledge not to manufacture or 
receive nuclear explosives, of any type.  These states also agree upon 
safeguards on all nuclear activities and facilities under the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), an affiliate of the United Nations.  It attempts to “seek to 
accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and 
prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that 
assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not 
used in such a way as to further any military purpose” (IAEA, 2013).  All countries 
agreed not to ship nuclear equipment or material except under IAEA safeguards 
and to ensure the spread of peaceful nuclear technologies (Cirincione et al., 
2005).  Lastly, all nuclear weapons states agreed to work in good faith to achieve 
nuclear disarmament under international control. 
 
The IAEA is the verification system for the NPT.  Under the NPT, all states must 
accept the IAEA safeguards, with very few exemptions.  These exemptions can 
include nuclear materials for narrow military purposes like nuclear naval vessels 
(Cirincione et al., 2005).  However, the IAEA does not have the legal power to 
search for nuclear weapons or the production of nuclear weapons. 
 
6.1.2 The Nuclear Suppliers Group 
In addition to the NPT, there is a coalition of nations called the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) that voluntarily restricts the movement of nuclear equipment and 
materials that could be used to develop nuclear weapons (Tobey, 2012).  This 
group pledged to provide physical security for nuclear materials and in 2004 they 
added a mechanism permitting member states to prevent the export of materials 
they suspect might be used for a nuclear weapons program. 
 
6.1.3 International Regulation of Nuclear Technologies 
The NPT and the NSG, along with the IAEA as an inspection mechanism, allows 
for a robust regulation of nuclear materials and equipment.  However, without an 
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enforcement mechanism, the NPT is unable to prevent countries from acquiring 
nuclear technologies on the black market or developing their own homegrown 
technologies that can evolve from legitimate civilian programs.   
 
6.2 Chemical Technologies 
With the advent of the modern chemical industry, chemical technologies moved 
from a limited dual use technology to a very important part of many nations’ 
economies.  After the use of deadly chemical weapons in the First World War, 
the 1925 Geneva Convention banned their use in war, but not their creation or 
stockpiling.  During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union started negotiations 
on the Chemical Weapons Convention, in an attempt to eliminate chemical 
weapons from their arsenals.  The Australia group is a group of countries that 
voluntarily control their export of technologies and materials that are capable of 
being used for the manufacture of chemical weapons, see section 5.1.1. 
 
6.2.1 Chemical Weapons Convention 
In 1997, The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (or the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, known as the CWC).  As its title suggests, the 
CWC prohibits members from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, or 
retaining chemical weapons (CWC, 2013).  In order to build confidence among 
member states, the CWC includes a verification regime that allows for systematic 
inspections of all declared production facilities.  This includes both civilian and 
military facilities.  The CWC also includes several provisions to encourage 
chemical equipment trade between its member states for peaceful purposes.  
Lastly, the CWC created the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons to oversee the inspections and verification proceedings (Cirincione et 
al., 2005). 
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6.2.3 International Regulation of Chemical Technologies 
Together, the CWC and the Australia Group control the flow of technologies and 
materials that will be used to develop chemical weapons.  The CWC contains a 
stronger enforcement mechanism than the NPT’s IAEA inspection system, but is 
not able to inspect non-member states, such as Syria and Israel. 
 
6.3 Rocket and Missile Technologies 
Rocket and missile technologies are dual use because a rocket that is used for a 
legitimate space exploration or satellite program can be converted into a tool that 
delivers a weapon over a great distance. 
 
6.3.1 Missile Technology Control Regime 
In 1987, The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) came into force.  It is 
designed to slow the spread of unmanned delivery systems for weapons (MTCR, 
2013).  The MTCR is an informal group that uses export controls on technology 
that could be used for ballistic and cruise missiles capable of traveling more than 
300 kilometers with a 500-kilogram payload (Mistry, 2003). 
 
In 2002 the Hague Code of Conduct (also known as the ICOC) was developed to 
strengthen the MTCR.  This included attempting to ensure that any space launch 
vehicle (SLV) technology or aid is not manipulated to further a missile program, 
voluntarily allowing international observers to SLV launch sites, and providing 
prelaunch notification for both missiles and SLV launches (Cirincione et al., 
2005). 
 
6.3.2 U.S. Unilateral Measures 
In addition to the MTCR and the ICOC, the U.S. has imposed unilateral sanctions 
on certain foreign companies suspected of helping to develop missile programs 
in locations such as Iran and North Korea.  These measures are often used 
under laws passed to prevent weapons technologies from moving to certain 
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countries and such actions are allowed under the international agreements listed 
in sections 6.3.1 (Tobey, 2012). 
 
6.4 Lessons Learned from Dual Use Technologies: Nuclear, 
Chemical, and Missile 
The examples in sections 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 are often cited as the quintessential 
dual use issues.  All of these technologies began their careers without much, if 
any, formal government oversight.  These different dual use technologies and 
their international enforcement mechanisms may be models for the emerging 
DNA synthesis technologies.  However, these technologies and their regulatory 
regimes are not perfectly analogous to DNA synthesis. 
 
6.5 Key Differences in DNA Synthesis 
DNA synthesis technologies are cheaper and more ubiquitous than nuclear, 
chemical, or missile technologies.  The recent trend of rising DNA synthesis 
ability, coupled with falling costs for synthesis, has led to a global proliferation of 
DNA synthesis technologies and companies.  DNA synthesis technologies are 
already diffused and their development is cheaper than nuclear or missile 
technologies, which often require substantial government support.  High quality 
second-generation DNA synthesizers can already be purchased on eBay for less 
than $50,000 (eBay, 2013). 
 
In addition to becoming cheaper and more dispersed than nuclear, missile, and 
most chemical technologies, DNA synthesis technology also has a globalized 
system of reagents, the precursors needed to construct synthetic DNA (Maurer et 
al., 2009).  Unlike chemical technologies or nuclear materials, controlling the 
reagents would be difficult through international regulation, as many providers 
already exist. 
 
Lastly, DNA synthesis technology is still a maturing industry.  Unlike nuclear, 
chemical, and missile technologies, DNA synthesis is advancing rapidly and 
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predicting its future course is very difficult (Carlson, 2009).  This means that 
using written rules and lists, such as those used by the existing international 
frameworks, will be ineffective in the long run.  In one possible scenario, the 
technology will simply work around these “road blocks” and use other means and 
materials for advancement and diffusion.  In another possible scenario, the 
advancement of the technology could be halted by strong international measures 
controlling its creation and diffusion. 
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7. DNA Synthesis Tools and Industry: Possible Future 
Paths 
Over the lifetime of the DNA synthesis industry, there have been a series of 
important breakthroughs that have created a virtuous cycle.  This cycle was 
created by lowering the cost of synthetic DNA, which stimulated demand for 
more synthetic DNA.  In turn this encouraged more development in DNA 
synthesis.  However, this cycle has begun to encounter diminishing returns 
(Maurer et al., 2009).  New technologies will be developed that promise to further 
improve DNA synthesis, as long as a healthy market for synthetic DNA continues 
to grow.  In the end, the size and structure of the DNA synthesis industry and the 
development of the technology will be determined by emerging economic, 
technical, and regulatory factors (Carlson, 2009). 
 
7.1 Advancing Technologies 
DNA synthesis technology can still be improved and advanced upon.  Academic 
labs and research labs at companies like the Cetus Corporation and Gen9 are 
constantly working to improve existing technology and to develop new 
technology to construct synthetic DNA.  In the future, it will be impossible to 
predict where the next large technological breakthroughs will emerge.  However, 
if they drive down the price of synthetic DNA while maintaining speed and quality, 
research efforts and societal benefits will accelerate. 
 
7.1.1 Advanced Synthesizers 
As stated above, the Cambridge, MA based company Gen9 claims to be in the 
process of developing tools and techniques that will increase the global DNA 
synthesis ability by one third (Goldberg, 2013).  If their claims are accurate, this 
technology could have the potential to change the DNA synthesis industry.  If 
there are currently a handful of large DNA synthesis companies that use 
economies of scale to produce synthetic DNA at a lower cost, then having the 
most advanced technology is vital.  Assuming Gen9’s technology is as accurate 
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as the current industry’s best technologies and that it can create similar length 
DNA sequences, the users of this technology would have an advantage over 
other firms.  The CEO of Gen9 claims that the cost will drop by “orders of 
magnitude.” (Carlson, 2013).  However, without hard data on the technology and 
costs of Gen9’s synthesis tools, it is difficult to determine if their claims of a game 
changing technology are accurate. 
 
7.2 Changing Market Structure 
As DNA synthesis technology continues to advance, the benefits are not limited 
to the large firms using the most advanced technology.  Less advanced or 
wealthy users will have more access to DNA synthesis because more DNA 
synthesizers will be available on the market as firms upgrade their existing 
hardware.  A simple search of eBay.com for “DNA synthesizer” yields over a 
dozen high quality (used) machines (eBay.com, 2013).  In addition to driving 
down the costs of DNA synthesis technologies, the newest machines are able to 
automate what used to be done by highly trained technicians (Maurer et al., 
2009).  This means that industries that consume synthetic DNA, but were not 
able to economically produce it for themselves, may now be able to.  This 
represents a lateral diffusion of the DNA synthesis technologies, but security will 
become a more important issue as the technology and industry decentralize. 
 
7.2.1 Large Consumers Bring DNA Synthesis In House 
As DNA synthesis capacity grows all around the world, another trend is 
emerging.  This trend is not from the DNA synthesis industry, but from their 
largest customers.  As drugs and therapies based on genetic information and 
living systems begin to play a larger role at pharmaceutical companies, these 
companies may begin to limit their use of outside DNA synthesis companies.  
Many large pharmaceutical companies claim this is for quality control and rapid 
turnaround time.  However, there are also associated Intellectual Property 
issues.  Many large firms have already been the victims of industrial espionage.  
As the industry is currently organized, these firms must send out orders for 
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synthetic DNA to another company.  While nearly all DNA synthesis companies 
have non-disclosure agreements, there is still substantial financial risk (Maurer et 
al., 2009). 
 
In addition to having another company see proprietary data, that company is also 
going to screen the order as a member of the IASB or the IGSC.  This screening 
will attempt to determine what each part of the order does individually and as a 
whole.  Some regulators have suggested a centralized screening system that 
makes it difficult to order various parts from different suppliers to assemble into a 
dangerous sequence later.  Also, if such a centralized system was established, 
many firms would be reluctant to send their intellectual property to be screened 
and then sequenced. 
 
7.3 The Necessity of the DNA Synthesis Industry 
It is possible that the entire DNA synthesis industry will only exist for a short 
amount of time.  As the technology advances and diffuses, the value that these 
companies are able to provide with their highly trained workforce and economies 
of scale is likely to diminish.  Assembling large DNA constructs is currently a 
technological challenge, but newer DNA synthesizers are beginning to automate 
the construction of larger and larger DNA sequences.  As the technology 
advances, the capability to create such large constructs will diffuse and the value 
currently added by DNA synthesis companies may diminish (Carlson, 2009). 
 
7.4 Government Regulation 
It seems counterintuitive that companies would want the government to enter 
their market, set up, and enforce strict rules or guidelines on safety or security.  
However, many industries encourage just that.  This is called regulatory capture, 
a theory associated with Nobel Laureate Economist, George Stigler.  This theory 
describes how regulatory agencies will eventually become dominated by the very 
industries they are designed to regulate.  The firms encourage this to protect 
their market share from new entrants and to create a type of market imperfection 
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where new entrants into the industry must pass very costly standards in order to 
compete (Oye, 2012). 
 
7.5 The Changes in the DNA Synthesis Industry 
The DNA synthesis industry, including the synthesizing companies and their 
customers, is advancing and growing rapidly.  In the future, newer technologies 
will change both the DNA synthesis technologies and also the industry’s 
structure. 
 
As the technology improves and costs decline, there will likely be both vertical 
and horizontal diffusions of DNA synthesis technology.  From a security 
standpoint, this will make it difficult to ensure that nefarious actors are not able to 
acquire synthetic DNA.  As the technology becomes more diffused, users will no 
longer have to rely on commercial synthesizers.  Another method must be 
developed to ensure that synthetic DNA is not created for nefarious purposes. 
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8. iGEM as a Case Study in Security Methods 
The International Genetically Engineered Machine competition (iGEM) began in 
2003 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).  Originally, the 
competition challenged student groups to design and construct a unique 
biological system that could make a network of cells “blink,” or change 
fluorescence in the presence of different stimuli.  In the 2012 competition, there 
were more than 190 teams from 35 countries with more than 3,000 
undergraduate students in participation.  Each year, iGEM sends a kit with 
different genes to student groups at different universities.  The parts are the 
physical DNA that are placed into a ring of DNA material known as a plasmid, 
which allows for easy insertion into a host cell.  The students then spend the 
summer designing and building biological systems.  The ideas and goals are only 
limited by the teams’ imagination and their technical ability (iGEM, 2013). 
 
The competition’s expansion from an MIT winter term class to a truly international 
competition puts the iGEM leadership at the forefront of many issues relating to 
safety and security of biological technologies, and synthetic DNA in particular. 
 
8.1 Registry of Standard Biological Parts 
The iGEM Registry of Standard Biological Parts describes itself as a 
"continuously growing collection of genetic parts that can be mixed and matched 
to build synthetic biology devices and systems. Founded in 2003 at MIT, the 
Registry is part of the Synthetic Biology community's efforts to make biology 
easier to engineer. It provides a resource of available genetic parts to iGEM 
teams and academic labs" (Registry of Standard Biological Parts Website, 2013).  
The Registry is based on an open source philosophy similar to the Linux 
operating software.  Everyone is allowed to use the information provided in it, as 
long as what he or she creates with the information is given back to the Registry 
in order to improve it.  However, issues have arisen with this open source 
platform.  Everyone is allowed to contribute to the Registry, and some of these 
contributions could lead to dangerous uses.  Because of its free and open source 
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nature, the Registry had never screened its parts.  It relied entirely on the skill 
and dedication of those submitting parts to provide the part (a DNA sample sent 
to iGEM headquarters) and an accurate and complete description of the part, 
including where it came from and how it was separated from its original host. 
 
8.2 iGEM Safety Committee 
The iGEM Safety Committee is a small group that ensures that iGEM is 
conducted safely and securely, and that there are no violations of U.S. or 
international law.  In 2012, the members of the iGEM safety committee included 
Peter Carr, Kenneth Oye, Piers Millett, Todd Kuiken, King Chow, Allen Lin, Ralph 
Turlington, Shlomiya Bar-Yam, Julie McNamara, Rocco Casagrande, Michael 
Imperiale, Jef Boeke, George Church, Toby Richardson, and Ed You.  In order to 
ensure safety, members of the Committee spend hours looking over project 
ideas and their safety submissions and monitor the teams’ efforts in relation to 
their safety submissions.  Over time, the screening has grown in both size and 
complexity.  The ad hoc nature of the screenings allowed several incidents 
(described in sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2) that prompted changes in iGEM, the 
Registry, and how safety information is exchanged between participants and the 
Safety Committee. 
 
In addition to the online materials that the teams need to complete, there are 
safety courses and videos for teams whose universities do not have biological 
safety committees and protocols.  At the annual world championship at MIT, U.S. 
FBI Special Agent, Ed You, gives a presentation on security in the biological 
sciences.  This is one of the best-attended talks during the championship and 
always generates a lot of discussion.  Many attendees are international students 
who are curious about biosecurity and best practices in the U.S.  Such outreach 
can have positive effects, as ideas spread about best practices and both U.S. 
and international students realize the importance of safety and security in their 
research.   
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8.3 iGEM’s Responses to Safety and Security Gaps 
In the 2011 and 2012 iGEM competitions there were two separate incidents that 
prompted changes in iGEM’s screening process of projects and safety 
information.  First was the decision to screen the Registry of Standard Biological 
Parts to ensure the safety and efficacy of the parts.  Second was the effort to 
screen projects earlier to be sure that potentially dangerous parts were not 
shipped across the world (possibly in violation of U.S. and international laws). 
 
8.3.1 Team Attempts to use Vibrio cholerae and iGEM’s Response 
In the 2011 iGEM competition, the Safety Committee screeners noticed that a 
team had indicated that they were using a part from the organism Vibrio cholerae 
on their safety page.  Some strains of this type of bacteria can cause the 
disease, Cholera.  Vibrio cholerae is a biosafety level 3 organism.  This means 
special precautions must be taken when handling the organism or its parts.  In 
addition, these organisms are defined as infectious agents that may cause 
serious or potentially lethal diseases as a result of exposure by inhalation 
(Onderdonk, 2013).  This means that special precautions should be taken when 
working with Vibrio cholerae.  Some of these precautions include a specialized 
(and secure) laboratory to work with the organism, specialized equipment to 
dispose of biological residues associated with the organism, and highly 
specialized equipment worn by laboratory workers. 
 
The Safety Committee also noted that the student team had not marked off that  
Vibrio cholerae was a dangerous organism.  In addition, the team also stated that 
their university had no local biosafety committee that oversaw biological work at 
the university.  After a small amount of research, members of the Safety 
Committee discovered that the university did in fact have a local biosafety 
committee.  This prompted the committee to contact the team and its supervisor.  
The supervisor was not quick to respond; it took several weeks and a visit from 
an international member of the Safety Committee to figure out what the team was 
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doing.  In the meantime the Safety Committee had disqualified the team from the 
iGEM competition until they could prove that they were working safely and were 
in compliance with their local biosafety committee. 
 
Learning from this experience, iGEM and the Safety Committee rewrote the 
competition rules.  In addition, iGEM worked towards improving communication 
with team advisors to ensure that they had adequate knowledge about biosafety 
and biosecurity practices. 
 
8.3.2 Team Attempts to use Yersinia pestis and iGEM’s Response 
In the 2012 iGEM competition, a team attempted to use Yersinia pestis, the 
causative agent of plague.  Much like Vibrio cholerae, Yersinia pestis is a 
biosafety level 3 organism.  In addition, the team attempted to use a pathogenic 
gene from Yersinia pestis to insert genetic material into a mammalian cell.  The 
team neglected to present the use of Yersinia pestis on their safety page, and the 
Safety Committee did not know that the team was attempting to work with 
Yersina pestis until the world championships. 
 
When asked where their DNA sequence came from, the team said that they had 
requested and received DNA from an academic laboratory in the U.S.  In 
addition, they noted that the original piece they had originally tried to use was in 
the Registry of Standard Biological Parts and had been shipped out from iGEM 
headquarters. 
 
With a quick examination of the Registry, the Safety Committee learned that the 
part that was shipped out was only 14 base pairs long.  This is too short to be a 
useful gene and could not have been a part of the pathogenic system of Yersinia 
pestis.  However, had this been a functional part, would iGEM have been in 
violation of not only U.S. export control laws, but also the Australia Group? 
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8.4 Screening the Registry of Standard Biological Parts 
In addition to researching norms and regulations that are now affecting iGEM in 
the international arena, the Safety Committee developed a new screening 
checklist that must be completed by each team in their initial phases.  This 
checklist includes all parts that have been or will be used and where they came 
from.  In addition, if the team’s project changes, they will need to update the list 
and get approval from their adviser.  All changes must then be sent to the safety 
committee. 
 
In addition to these changes, the iGEM Safety Committee, led by Kenneth Oye, 
has enlisted the help of Synthetic Genomics and the IGSC to screen the Registry 
of Standard Biological parts.  The IGSC screening will be representative of 
current industry’s best practices.  Synthetic Genomics will be using their new 
Archetype tool to screen the Registry.  It is expected that the two screenings will 
produce useful insight on the safety and efficacy of the Registry’s parts.  Both of 
these screenings will be done along with a computer-based text screening to 
address mislabeled parts. 
 
8.5 iGEM as an Example of Successful Adaptation to Safety and 
Security Gaps 
iGEM is an example of an open and international organization facing numerous 
challenges.  Through an open engagement process with the community and 
within itself, it has weathered many challenges listed in section 8.3, but now has 
stronger safety and security positions going forward.   
 
iGEM has worked closely with the FBI and regulators such as Public Health 
Canada to improve its best practices.  iGEM strives to teach student groups that 
while synthetic biology research has enormous potential for good, it could also be 
harmful if improperly used. 
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9. Policy Recommendations and Implications 
The DNA synthesis industry is a globalized and rapidly changing industry.  Large 
gene synthesis orders already move all over the world; a company’s physical 
location is becoming less important.  In addition, the opportunity for researchers 
to acquire synthetic DNA from all over the world is growing.  In the 2013 iGEM 
competition, a team from Asia asked for a part from an MIT lab.  The part was 
shipped across the world for an undergraduate competition in fewer than two 
weeks.  In an already globalized world, with all trends pointing to further 
integration of technologies and industries, what can be done to best promote and 
enhance security in the DNA synthesis industry? 
 
9.1 Other Dual Use Technologies are Different than Synthetic DNA 
Heavy government intervention is likely to be minimally effective if applied to 
DNA synthesis.  This is because DNA synthesis technology is fundamentally 
different than technologies that are heavily regulated by governments, such as 
nuclear, chemical, or missile technologies.  Nuclear and missile technologies are 
very expensive and require large capital expenditures to acquire specially 
designed and constructed components.  This makes it difficult for anyone but 
national governments to purchase and promote these types of technologies.  
Because of these costs, it is also easier for intelligence agencies and the 
international community to monitor and track these technologies.  Chemical 
technologies do not require the intensive capital that nuclear and missile 
technologies require.  However, in order to construct effective chemical weapons, 
specialized precursors are needed in large quantities. 
 
Synthetic DNA is also different from these other technologies because the 
necessary precursors to constructing synthetic DNA are only needed in small 
quantities to construct a dangerous organism.  This stems from the self-
replicating nature of life forms: one dangerous pathogen can replicate itself and 
spread across the globe. 
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9.2 U.S. Government Involvement: A Light Touch 
Heavy government involvement is unlikely to be effective in promoting security in 
the DNA synthesis industry; the government should try a different approach.  The 
U.S. government should promote existing best practices and devote resources to 
studying and improving these practices.  There are a number of ways to do this: 
 
Setting and publicizing a minimum allowable standard that follows the 
current IGSC and IASB protocols.  The current U.S. government standard is 
voluntary and has been criticized for being less stringent than the existing 
industry’s best practices under the IGSC Harmonized Screening Protocols or the 
IASB Code of Conduct.  The government could follow industry’s best practices 
and publicize them to encourage DNA synthesis firms.  This would also 
encourage consumers of synthetic DNA to pressure their suppliers to follow 
these best practices as well.  In addition, the government could provide 
companies that are following best practices legal immunity if a nefarious actor 
attempted to use their synthetic DNA. 
 
Using “Red Teams” to test and enforce the current screening consortia.  
The use of red teaming to try and breech the screening defenses of companies 
would ensure that all companies take the screening seriously and that no 
company feels that another company is slacking in their screening.   
 
Creating and maintaining a list of overseas companies, institutions, and 
researchers that can order synthetic DNA without being further 
investigated.  Creating a database of certified researchers and labs overseas 
would allow these researchers to purchase synthetic DNA from U.S. based 
suppliers and would reduce their incentive to use less reputable suppliers.   
 
Maintain up to date registries for dangerous sequences and persons.  The 
government already maintains such databases, but they are scattered and often 
redundant.  The government could aid the screening consortia and the scientific 
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community in general by maintaining an up-to-date and easy to access database 
of dangerous pathogens, and persons or companies of concern.  Having a one 
stop shop for this information would reduce the screening costs for companies 
and would also encourage better screening. 
 
9.2 Future Policy Recommendations 
Even today, DNA synthesizers can be acquired quickly and at relatively low cost.  
There are numerous examples of DNA synthesis tools available for online 
purchase (eBay, 2013).  Because DNA synthesis is not yet a fully automated 
technology, training and experience are still required to create gene length 
synthetic DNA.  However, as the technology advances, DNA synthesis tools will 
move from the industrial and laboratory setting into the realm of Do-It-Yourself 
Biologists and amateur scientists.  The current screening consortia and 
government guidelines may lose effectiveness as DNA synthesis technologies 
become more diffused, in geographic location and across levels of expertise.  
However, there exist strategies that government, academia, law enforcement, 
and the synthesis industry can follow to mitigate these possible future security 
issues. 
 
Encourage reporting of suspicious behavior and reduce negative 
repercussions for incorrect leads.  The FBI is currently conducting an 
outreach program to academic labs and members of the Do-It-Yourself Biology 
Community (You, 2011).  Special Agent Ed You, who is spearheading the effort, 
is encouraging this outreach and formation of community alliances.  The FBI 
knows that if a nefarious actor wanted to construct a dangerous pathogen, they 
are likely to let someone know either intentionally or by accident.  By reaching 
out now, the FBI hopes that community members would report suspicious 
behavior before the nefarious actor can do harm. 
 
Encourage safety and security best practices through outreach and 
educational programs like iGEM.  The iGEM competition is an excellent test 
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bed to encourage and study issues in safety, security, and best practices.  In 
addition to iGEM’s educational ability, it is also heavily international.  This gives 
iGEM a captive audience of members who are likely to be leaders in 
biotechnologies, biological engineering, and synthetic biology.  Using educational 
outreach programs like iGEM to promote best practices in synthetic biology could 
be applied to other areas of biotechnology, including DNA synthesis. 
 
9.3 Closing Thoughts 
DNA synthesis is fundamentally different than other dual use technologies.  
However, general lessons drawn from other dual use technologies can still be 
applied.  International cooperation will be vital to promoting best standards for 
DNA synthesis around the globe.  Having experts and leaders in the DNA 
synthesis field meet to discuss best practices and security issues will improve the 
security of DNA synthesis.  In addition, countries that are often shut out of 
discussions led by the U.S. or Europe should still be invited to participate in such 
discussions.  In the end, it is in their best interest to promote security in their DNA 
synthesis industries.  It is surely in the U.S.’s best interest to have everyone 
understand and promote high levels of safety and security. 
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10. Conclusions and Areas of Further Study 
The global biotechnology industry may be a game changing technology for the 
21st century.  The growing biotechnology industry feeds the growing demand for 
synthetic DNA.  However, there are associated security issues with the ability to 
synthesize longer and more complex DNA sequences.  These include the 
potential that a nefarious actor or group would purchase the genetic code for a 
dangerous human pathogen to develop a weapon.  The global DNA synthesis 
industry has instituted two voluntary consortia (the IGSC and the IASB) where 
members screen DNA orders and their customers placing the orders.  The 
industry hopes that these screening processes will deter those who would 
acquire synthetic DNA in order to do harm, and would alert authorities to 
suspicious orders and persons. 
 
Looking forward, there will be more discussion of what changes should be made 
to the current screening regime.  Currently, the U.S. government does not have 
legally binding regulations and the released guidelines are currently less capable 
than what is mandated by the current screening consortia.  Many of these future 
policy actions need to be based on how the DNA synthesis industry changes 
over the coming years if it continues to exist as a service.   
 
However, even without promulgating mandatory regulations for the DNA 
synthesis industry, there are several governmental policies that would improve 
DNA synthesis security in the near and long term.  These include encouraging 
suspicious behavior reports by everyone who works in biotechnology, including 
DNA synthesis providers, Do-It-Yourself Biologists, and researchers at 
universities.  Additionally the government should encourage the use of industry’s 
best practices and publicize the benefits of the voluntary screening consortia.  In 
addition, the government can aid the consortia by creating a master list of 
dangerous pathogens and their sequences, as well as a list of individuals or 
groups who are forbidden from ordering synthetic DNA.  Also, the government 
can act as a red team by initiating suspect orders to synthetic DNA providers to 
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test their screening protocols.  Lastly, the government, industry, academia, and 
regulators can seek international cooperation in the iGEM competition to move 
forward on issues of safety and security through the use of adaptive regulation. 
 
DNA synthesis technology has the potential to positively transform our world.  
This technology will have the greatest chance of achieving its potential if it is not 
held back by stiff regulations.  However, like all dual use technologies, it also has 
the potential to do great harm if it is misused intentionally or accidentally.  It is 
clear that there are policy options that would encourage development of DNA 
synthesis technologies and improve the current security regime.  The analysis 
presented in this thesis offers a perspective into the DNA synthesis industry and 
its security regime, and how the government can take proactive policy measures 
that would improve future security. 
 
Looking forward, this thesis compared DNA synthesis to other dual use 
technologies and how the U.S. and the international community regulate these 
technologies.  Additional research could examine other industries that are not 
considered dual use industries but have parallels to DNA synthesis in their 
ubiquity, growing importance, and ease of access. 
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11. Appendices 
 
11.1 IASB Code of Conduct 
Created in Cambridge, MA. Nov. 3, 2009 
1 Preamble 
The field of Synthetic Biology is gaining momentum in the academic and 
commercial world and evolving rapidly. In parallel, a market for Synthetic Biology 
products and services has developed and grown rapidly over the past ten years. 
 
The International Association Synthetic Biology represents a number of 
companies and organizations with a stake in Synthetic Biology, for instance as 
providers of double‐stranded recombinant DNA synthesis (hereinafter “gene 
synthesis”) or bioinformatics products. IASB has created this Code of 
Conduct in order to secure the foundations of this fledgling field against abuse 
and to bring Synthetic Biology to its full potential. It is aimed at all providers of 
gene synthesis services. 
 
The most fundamental tools for the design of Synthetic Biology applications are 
synthetic genes and their intrinsic features of freedom of design and artificial 
biological function.  This Code of Conduct helps companies that provide DNA 
synthesis services and products and academic and public institutions that 
practice DNA synthesis to conduct their business in a sensible and responsible 
way. 
Declaration: 
The Undersigned herewith declare that they are in full agreement with the need 
for a safe and responsible use of synthetic DNA. They strictly follow all 
regulations and international standards designed to safeguard against intentional 
or unintentional abuse of synthetic DNA. 
 
2 General Considerations 
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Synthetic Biology provides the means to accelerate the assembly of complex 
biological networks and to rapidly create biological entities with new properties. 
These powers will undoubtedly lead to a number of beneficial developments such 
as sustainable biofuels, new therapeutics, and biodegradable plastics.  However, 
the efficiency and potential power of Synthetic Biology can also create the risk of 
abuse.  Through rapid DNA synthesis, biorisk‐associated genes such as toxin 
genes or virulence factors become accessible to a large number of users. 
 
In order to contain the risks of Synthetic Biology and to protect the field against 
misuse, the Undersigned have adopted this Code of Conduct, which provides 
guidelines for safe, secure, and responsible commercial or non‐commercial DNA 
synthesis. One important consideration of any regulation for biosafety and 
biosecurity is the freedom of research: A lot of beneficial developments would be 
impossible without the freedom to explore organisms and genes that bear a 
certain environmental or health risk. It is our conviction that such a risk can be 
managed and contained in a secure manner, while at the same time ensuring the 
level of freedom that is necessary for desired scientific advancements. 
 
It is our declared intention to raise barriers for malign attackers through a number 
of measures that will combine to protect Synthetic Biology from abuse. We aim at 
encouraging continued improvements and harmonization in this field, as well as 
adoption and further evolution of this Code of Conduct and the Best Practice 
Guidelines in the future. 
 
The Undersigned will participate or otherwise reasonably contribute for regular 
scientific dialogue on the further evolution of screening, best practices and the 
topic of virulence factors and positive or negative lists of elements against which 
synthetic genes should be screened. 
 
The Undersigned promise to develop a compliance plan for adherence to this 
Code of conduct.  This Code has been expressly designed to guide companies 
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and other entities engaged in the synthesis of double stranded DNA of minimum 
200 base pairs in length and multi‐gene constructs. 
 
The Undersigned express no opinion about the extent to which the standards 
described herein may be applicable to the much shorter sequences known as 
“oligos.” 
 
3 Risk assessment and risk management 
Abuse of synthetic genes in hazardous applications is possible in two ways only: 
Intentionally, and by failures in risk assessment and management. 
The technology of handling synthetic genes uses complex procedures, which by 
their nature are self contained and tightly controlled under existing standards of 
good practice. 
 
For biosecurity, risk assessment entails the screening of DNA sequences for 
genes which can be intentionally abused, for example, in terrorist activities, 
whereas risk management entails the restriction of access to synthetic DNA to 
legitimate users. 
 
4 Record keeping 
• Records of suspicious inquiries and positive screening hits will be kept for at 
least 8 years. 
• Statistics on biosecurity and biosafety related inquiries and orders will be kept 
for at least 8 years.  Information to be retained shall include the total number of 
inquiries and orders for synthetic genes, the number of inquiries and orders with 
positive screening hits, and the number of orders with positive screening hits 
which have been respectively filled or rejected. 
 
5 Cooperation with Authorities 
Gene synthesis providers shall take reasonable steps to maintain 
communications with the government in the nation where they are 
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headquartered. Gene synthesis providers shall promptly inform these authorities 
each time they encounter evidence which clearly suggests possible illegal 
activities. Such evidence will include, by way of example, inquiries and orders 
that strongly suggest illegal activities, such as attempts to conceal a nonbusiness 
delivery address.” 
 
6 Sequence Screening 
• Gene synthesis companies should always take reasonable steps to determine 
the relationship of the requested sequences to risk‐associated sequences before 
sending them to customers.  The following procedure reflects IASB members’ 
best collective judgment of how to achieve this goal within the framework of 
existing technology: 
 
1) DNA sequences submitted as inquiries or orders for DNA synthesis by 
customers will be screened against GENBANK for reasonable sequence 
similarity to pathogens.  Members may take further reasonable steps to 
determine the function and evaluate the associated biorisk associated with 
homologous genes following procedures to be defined by the Technical Experts 
Group on Biosecurity (hereinafter “TEGB”). Pending such procedures, providers 
shall determine and follow their own best practices. 
2) In addition to determining biorisk, entities shall also comply with all national 
laws. This will include reviewing and comparing top homology hits against (a) all 
Australia Group biological dual‐use organisms, (b) The U.S. Select Agent and 
Toxins list, and (c) against national organism lists for export control or biological 
safety/security. 
 
• The foregoing procedure establishes a benchmark capability for detecting 
threat sequences.  However we expect researchers to develop new sequence 
screening technologies over time.  Members shall be free to adopt such 
alternative technologies provided that the new methods have first been 
empirically shown to detect threat sequences at reliability levels that meet or 
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exceed the benchmark methods described above, as elaborated by TEGB over 
time. IASB members pledge to promptly update this Code of Conduct to reflect 
such new (and potentially higher) standards as they appear. 
 
• IASB members pledge to take ongoing, collective efforts to refine and improve 
today’s screening technologies over time. These shall include: 
 
1) Establishing a standing Committee to review and if necessary update and 
extend this Code of Conduct in light of changing threats and/or technology 
advances over time. 
 
2) Regularly exchanging literature searches, virulence judgments, and other data 
needed to determine the function and/or threat potential of Genbank genes 
through a secure on‐line collaboration to be hosted by the University of 
California’s Goldman School of Public Policy (VIREP). 
 
3) Regularly exchanging, discussing, and collaborating on best practices and 
ideas through person‐to‐person contacts and through a secure on‐line 
collaboration. 
 
• Providers that find that a requested gene may code for functions that pose a 
biosecurity risk shall not fill such orders unless and until they have conducted 
intensive customer screening at the highest levels provided for in Section 8 of 
this Code. 
 
7 Response to Identified Threats 
• Whenever any of the procedures described in Section 6 produce a “hit” as 
defined by the then‐applicable TEGB guidance, the hit will be assessed by a 
molecular biologist or similar subject matter expert. 
• When the hit is deemed authentic, 
1) the customer will be notified and made aware of the perceived risk, 
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2) the order will be accepted only if the customer is a legitimate user (see section 
8) and all national regulations that apply to the exporting/producing company 
have been met. 
 
3) National authorities shall be contacted as to the extent provided for in Section 
5. 
 
8 Customer Screening 
Gene synthesis providers should always take reasonable steps to confirm that 
their customers are who they say they are. Where customers seek risk‐
associated sequences, providers should take further reasonable efforts to 
confirm that the customer seeks the requested sequence for legitimate purposes, 
and has carefully considered any safety or security risks potentially associated 
with their use of the sequence. The following procedure reflects IASB members’ 
best collective judgment of how to achieve these goals within the framework of 
existing technology: 
 
• In a first step, which is to be performed for all orders independent of whether 
they are considered to be risk‐associated: 
 
1) A minimum set of identification data for the customer will be retrieved, 
including postal address, institution, country, telephone number, and email 
address 
 
2) These data will be kept on record according to section 4. 
 
• When an ordered synthetic gene is identified as a risk‐associated sequence, 
the following steps are to be performed: 
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1) The legitimacy of the customer will be determined by a commercially‐
reasonable inquiry by the gene synthesis provider and the decision of legitimacy 
will be documented. 
 
2) It will be ensured that the stated postal address is not a residential address nor 
a PO box or similar address with limited traceability. 
 
3) The foregoing determination shall include, inter alia, verifying the addresses of 
businesses and institutions which placed the order, and ensuring that the 
address owner is a legitimate organization (such as a registered business or an 
internationally recognized academic institution). 
 
The foregoing procedure establishes a benchmark capability for screening 
customers. However we expect researchers to develop new screening methods 
over time. Members shall be free to adopt such alternative methods provided that 
they meet or exceed the benchmark methods described above. IASB members 
pledge to promptly update this Code of Conduct to reflect such new (and 
potentially higher) standards as they appear. 
IASB members pledge to take ongoing, collective efforts to refine and improve 
today’s screening technologies over time. These shall include (a) establishing a 
standing Committee to review and if necessary update and extend this Code of 
Conduct in light of changing threats and/or technology advances over time, and 
(b) regularly exchanging, discussing, and collaborating on best practices and 
ideas through person‐to‐person contacts and through a secure on‐line 
collaboration. 
 
Where the provider’s investigation reveals that its immediate customer of a risk‐
associated gene is not the intended end‐user but will instead re‐ship the risk‐
associated gene to a third party end user, gene synthesis companies shall either 
(a) identify and investigate the end‐user as provided for in this Code, or (b) take 
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reasonable steps to confirm that its immediate customer has adopted and 
routinely follows procedures comparable to those provided for in this Code. 
 
9 Cooperation on Biosafety and Biosecurity 
• The Undersigned will participate in the formation of a Technical Expert Group 
on Biosecurity (TEGB). This group will review current design and 
implementations of biosafety and biosecurity measures, and will propose and 
initiate improvements. 
• The TEGB shall develop an IASB operated seal of approval program to certify 
compliance with this Code. Providers will be encouraged to apply for seals 
whether or not they are currently IASB members. 
 
11.2 IGSC Harmonized Screening Protocol 
Preamble 
This document outlines the standards and practices that IGSC gene synthesis 
companies apply to prevent the misuse of synthetic genes. By screening the 
sequences of ordered genes and vetting customers, IGSC companies help to 
ensure that science and industry realize the many benefits of gene synthesis 
technology while minimizing risk. 
 
The ICGS companies together represent approximately 80% of commercial gene 
synthesis capacity world-wide. 
 
1. Gene Sequence Screening 
 
IGSC companies screen synthetic gene orders to identify regulated pathogen 
sequences and other potentially dangerous sequences. 
 
1. IGSC companies screen the complete DNA sequence of every synthetic gene 
order against the DNA sequences in a Regulated Pathogen Database, and 
against all entries found in one or more of the internationally coordinated 
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sequence reference databanks (i.e., NCBI/GenBank, EBI/EMBL, or DDBJ). The 
IGSC is currently assembling a Regulated Pathogen Database that will include 
data from all organisms on the Select Agent list, the Australia Group List, and 
any other national list of regulated pathogens. Until this is deployed, each 
company is using its own database of pathogen sequences. At a minimum, IGSC 
companies screen for all pathogen and toxin genes from the U.S. Select Agents 
and Toxins List and/or from the list specified in paragraphs 1C351-1C354 of 
European Union Council Regulation 428/2009. 
 
2. IGSC companies translate all six reading frames of each synthetic gene into 
an amino acid sequence. This sequence is screened against the protein 
sequences derived from the databases described above. 
 
3. IGSC companies use automated screening as a filter to identify pathogen and 
toxin DNA sequences. When automated screening identifies a potential pathogen 
or toxin sequence, the order is reviewed by a human expert and is either 
accepted, accepted with a requirement for additional customer review, or 
rejected. 
 
2. Gene Customer Screening 
 
1. IGSC companies require identification data from all potential customers for 
synthetic genes, including at a minimum a shipping address, institution name, 
country, telephone number, and email address. We do not ship to PO Boxes. 
 
2. Potential customers are screened against OFAC’s SDN List, the Department 
of State’s Debarred List, and BIS’s Denied Persons, Entity, and Unverified lists, 
or the HADDEX list, and/or any other list required by applicable national 
regulations. 
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3. IGSC companies require additional customer screening before accepting 
orders for DNA sequences from regulated pathogens. Although the U.S. Select 
Agent Regulations and the European Commission regulations do not restrict 
access to all Select Agent genes, IGSC companies supply genes from regulated 
pathogens only to researchers in government laboratories, universities, non-profit 
research institutions, or industrial laboratories demonstrably engaged in 
legitimate research. Customers ordering Select Agent or Australia Group DNA 
fragments must provide a written description of the intended use of the synthetic 
product; we verify independently a) the identity of the potential customer and 
purchasing organization, and b) that the described use is consistent with the 
activities of the purchasing organization. 
 
IGSC companies use the current recommendations from the U.S. CDC and/or 
the Department of Agriculture and/or the European Commission (CR42) to 
determine which DNA sequences are Select Agents as recombinant DNA 
fragments. We supply genes with such sequences only if the supplier and the 
customer are able to comply with all Select Agent regulations applicable to that 
gene. 
 
In general, IGSC companies only sell DNA or fragments of regulated pathogens 
to bone fide end-users. We do not sell or ship such material to distributers or 
other resellers, unless those companies identify the end-user receiving the 
products and demonstrate their compliance with every requirement otherwise 
applicable to that end-user. 
 
3. Record keeping 
 
1. Sequence Screen Results: IGSC companies retain records of every gene 
sequence screening result for at least 8 years. 
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2. Customer Screen Results: IGSC companies retain records of every customer 
screening result for at least 8 years. 
 
3. Product & Delivery Information: IGSC companies retain records of every gene 
synthesized and delivered for a minimum of 8 years after shipping, including at 
least the following: (a) the synthetic DNA sequence; (b) the vector; and (c) the 
recipient’s identity and shipping address. 
 
4. Order Refusal & Reporting 
 
1. IGSC companies reserve the right to refuse to fill any order and to notify 
authorities upon identifying potentially problematic orders. 
 
2. IGSC companies have established relationships with local and national law 
enforcement and intelligence authorities with whom we can share information to 
report and to prevent the potential misuse of synthetic genes. 
 
3. IGSC companies will report any request for a gene associated with the 
pathogenicity of an organism received from a suspicious potential customer 
and/or potential customer failing to establish its bone fides in application of the 
practices set forth in section 2. 
 
5. Regulatory Compliance 
 
1. IGSC companies comply with all applicable laws and regulations governing the 
synthesis, possession, transport, export, and import of gene synthesis and other 
products. 
 
2. We comply with World Health Organization recommendations concerning the 
distribution, handling, and synthesis of Variola virus DNA. 
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Consortium Collaborative Activities 
IGSC companies intend to work together in order to: 
 
1. Develop and update a Regulated Pathogen Database to include all gene 
sequences identified as potentially hazardous by authoritative groups such as the 
CDC, the Australia Group, and the U.S. and European governments. 
 
2. Ensure that we use the best and most effective algorithms to screen gene 
sequences against the Regulated Pathogen Database. 
 
3. Collaborate with our respective national governments in support of effective 
oversight of gene synthesis technology, and to encourage international 
coordination. 
 
4. Incorporate recommendations from the regulatory, scientific, and public 
interest communities into our screening and other biosecurity processes. 
 
Revisions to the Harmonized Screening Protocol 
 
This document represents an initial effort by a group of companies committed to 
the responsible use of gene synthesis technology. IGSC companies welcome 
comments and suggestions to improve the Harmonized Screening Protocol from 
scientists, regulators, and other interested parties. This document will be revised 
periodically in response to these suggestions and to changes in the scientific, 
technical, or regulatory environment. 
 
Terminology 
 
Gene Synthesis: This document uses the phrase “gene synthesis” to refer to the 
production of double-stranded, recombinant DNA fragments from 
oligonucleotides. Synthetic genes are typically provided in plasmid vectors. 
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Oligonucleotides: Chemically-synthesized, single-stranded DNA fragments, 
typically supplied as a solution in a tube or a multi-well plate. 
 
Synthetic Gene: A gene or other DNA fragment produced by gene synthesis, 
typically between 50 and 50,000 base pairs in length. 
 
Related Links 
Select Agents and Toxins List: 
http://www.selectagents.gov/Select%20Agents%20and%20Toxins%20List.html 
 
EU Council Resolution 428: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=408&lang=en 
 
HADDEX: 
http://www.ausfuhrkontrolle.info/ausfuhrkontrolle/de/arbeitshilfen/haddex/index.ht
ml 
 
OFAC’s SDN List: 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/ 
 
Department of State’s Debarred List: 
http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/debar.html 
 
BIS’s Denied Persons, Entity, and Unverified lists: 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/liststocheck.htm 
 
Current Recommendations from the U.S. CDC: 
http://www.selectagents.gov/SyntheticGenomics.html 
 
Australia Group Listed Source Organisms: 
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http://www.australiagroup.net/en/biological_agents.html 
 
World Health Organization Recommendations Concerning the Distribution, 
Handling, and Synthesis of Variola Virus DNA: 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/smallpox/SummaryrecommendationsMay08.pdf 
 
11.3 Australia Group Core Group 
List of Biological Agents for Export Control 
Viruses: 
Andes virus 
Chapare virus 
Chikungunya virus 
Choclo virus 
Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus 
Dengue fever virus 
Dobrava-Belgrade virus 
Eastern equine encephalitis virus 
Ebola virus 
Guanarito virus 
Hantaan virus 
Hendra virus (Equine morbillivirus) 
Japanese encephalitis virus 
Junin virus 
Kyasanur Forest virus 
Laguna Negra virus 
Lassa fever virus 
Louping ill virus 
Lujo virus 
Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus 
Machupo virus 
Marburg virus 
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Monkey pox virus 
Murray Valley encephalitis virus 
Nipah virus 
Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus 
Oropouche virus 
Powassan virus 
Rift Valley fever virus 
Rocio virus 
Sabia virus 
Seoul virus 
Sin nombre virus 
St Louis encephalitis virus 
Tick-borne encephalitis virus (Russian Spring-Summer encephalitis virus) 
Variola virus 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus 
Western equine encephalitis virus 
Yellow fever virus 
 
Bacteria: 
Bacillus anthracis 
Brucella abortus 
Brucella melitensis 
Brucella suis 
Chlamydophila psittaci (formerly known as Chlamydia psittaci) 
Clostridium botulinum 
Clostridium argentinense (formerly known as Clostridium botulinum Type G), 
botulinum neurotoxin producing strains 
Clostridium baratii, botulinum neurotoxin producing strains 
Clostridium butyricum, botulinum neurotoxin producing strains 
Francisella tularensis 
Burkholderia mallei (Pseudomonas mallei) 
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Burkholderia pseudomallei (Pseudomonas pseudomallei) 
Salmonella typhi 
Shigella dysenteriae 
Vibrio cholerae 
Yersinia pestis 
Clostridium perfringens, epsilon toxin producing types[2] 
Shiga toxin producing Escherichia coli (STEC) of serogroups O26, O45, O103, 
O104, O111, O121, O145, O157, and other shiga toxin producing serogroups[3] 
Coxiella burnetii 
Rickettsia prowazekii 
 
Toxins as follow and subunits thereof (4): 
Botulinum toxins[5] 
Clostridium perfringens alpha, beta 1, beta 2, epsilon and iota toxins 
Conotoxin[5] 
Ricin 
Saxitoxin 
Shiga toxin 
Staphylococcus aureus enterotoxins, hemolysin alpha toxin, and toxic shock 
syndrome toxin (formerly known as Staphylococcus enterotoxin F) 
Tetrodotoxin 
Verotoxin and shiga-like ribosome inactivating proteins 
Microcystin (Cyanginosin) 
Aflatoxins 
Abrin 
Cholera toxin 
Diacetoxyscirpenol toxin 
T-2 toxin 
HT-2 toxin 
Modeccin toxin 
Volkensin toxin 
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Viscum Album Lectin 1 (Viscumin) 
 
Fungi: 
Coccidioides immitis 
Coccidioides posadasii 
 
(1) Biological agents are controlled when they are an isolated live culture of a 
pathogen agent, or a preparation of a toxin agent which has been isolated or 
extracted from any source, or material including living material which has been 
deliberately inoculated or contaminated with the agent. Isolated live cultures of a 
pathogen agent include live cultures in dormant form or in dried preparations, 
whether the agent is natural, enhanced or modified. 
 
An agent is covered by this list except when it is in the form of a vaccine. A 
vaccine is a medicinal product in a pharmaceutical formulation licensed by, or 
having marketing or clinical trial authorization from, the regulatory authorities of 
either the country of manufacture or of use, which is intended to stimulate a 
protective immunological response in humans or animals in order to prevent 
disease in those to whom or to which it is administered. 
 
(2) It is understood that limiting this control to epsilon toxin-producing strains of 
Clostridium perfringens therefore exempts from control the transfer of other 
Clostridium perfringens strains to be used as positive control cultures for food 
testing and quality control. 
 
(3) Shiga toxin producing Escherichia coli (STEC) is also known as 
enterohaemorrhagic E. coli (EHEC) or verocytotoxin producing E. coli (VTEC). 
 
(4) Excluding immunotoxins. 
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(5) Excluding botulinum toxins and conotoxins in product form meeting all of the 
following criteria: 
 
are pharmaceutical formulations designed for testing and human administration 
in the treatment of medical conditions; 
are pre-packaged for distribution as clinical or medical products; and are 
authorized by a state authority to be marketed as clinical or medical products. 
 
Genetic Elements and Genetically-modified Organisms: 
Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the 
pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list. 
 
Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the 
toxins in the list, or for their sub-units. 
 
Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences associated 
with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list. 
 
Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for 
any of the toxins in the list or for their sub-units. 
 
Technical note: 
Genetically-modified organisms includes organisms in which the genetic material 
(nucleic acid sequences) has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally 
by mating and/or natural recombination, and encompasses those produced 
artificially in whole or in part. 
 
Genetic elements include inter alia chromosomes, genomes, plasmids, 
transposons, and vectors whether genetically modified or unmodified, or 
chemically synthesized in whole or in part. 
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Nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the micro-
organisms in the list means any sequence specific to the relevant listed micro-
organism: 
 
that in itself or through its transcribed or translated products represents a 
significant hazard to human, animal or plant health; or 
that is known to enhance the ability of a listed micro-organism, or any other 
organism into which it may be inserted or otherwise integrated, to cause serious 
harm to human, animal or plant health. 
 
These controls do not apply to nucleic acid sequences associated with the 
pathogenicity of enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli, serotype O157 and other 
verotoxin producing strains, other than those coding for the verotoxin, or for its 
sub-units. 
 
Warning List (1) 
 
Bacteria: 
Clostridium tetani (2) 
Legionella pneumophila 
Yersinia pseudotuberculosis 
Other strains of Clostridium species that produce botulinum neurotoxin (3) 
 
Fungi: 
Fusarium sporotrichioides 
Fusarium langsethiae 
 
(1) Biological agents are controlled when they are an isolated live culture of a 
pathogen agent, or a preparation of a toxin agent which has been isolated or 
extracted from any source, or material including living material which has been 
deliberately inoculated or contaminated with the agent. Isolated live cultures of a 
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pathogen agent include live cultures in dormant form or in dried preparations, 
whether the agent is natural, enhanced or modified. 
 
An agent is covered by this list except when it is in the form of a vaccine. A 
vaccine is a medicinal product in a pharmaceutical formulation licensed by, or 
having marketing or clinical trial authorization from, the regulatory authorities of 
either the country of manufacture or of use, which is intended to stimulate a 
protective immunological response in humans or animals in order to prevent 
disease in those to whom or to which it is administered. 
 
(2) The Australia Group recognizes that this organism is ubiquitous, but, as it has 
been acquired in the past as part of biological warfare programs, it is worthy of 
special caution. 
 
(3) It is the intent of Australia Group members to add to the control list strains of 
species of Clostridium identified as producing botulinum neurotoxin. 
 
Genetic Elements and Genetically-modified Organisms: 
Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with the 
pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list. 
 
Genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the 
toxins in the list, or for their sub-units. 
 
Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences associated 
with the pathogenicity of any of the microorganisms in the list. 
 
Genetically-modified organisms that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for 
any of the toxins in the list or for their sub-units. 
 
Technical note: 
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Genetically-modified organisms includes organisms in which the genetic material 
(nucleic acid sequences) has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally 
by mating and/or natural recombination, and encompasses those produced 
artificially in whole or in part. 
 
Genetic elements include inter alia chromosomes, genomes, plasmids, 
transposons, and vectors whether genetically modified or unmodified, or 
chemically synthesized in whole or in part. 
 
Nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of any of the micro-
organisms in the list means any sequence specific to the relevant listed micro-
organism: 
 
that in itself or through its transcribed or translated products represents a 
significant hazard to human, animal or plant health; or 
that is known to enhance the ability of a listed micro-organism, or any other 
organism into which it may be inserted or otherwise integrated, to cause serious 
harm to human, animal or plant health. 
 
11.4 Select Agents and Toxins List 
§ 73.3 HHS select agents and toxins.  
(a) Except for exclusions under paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, the HHS 
Secretary has determined that the biological agents and toxins listed in this 
section have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety.  
(b) HHS select agents and toxins:  
• Abrin  
• Botulinum neurotoxins  
• Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of  
• Clostridium  
• Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (Herpes B virus)  
• Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin  
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• Coccidioides posadasii/Coccidioides immitis  
• Conotoxins  
• Coxiella burnetii  
• Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus  
• Diacetoxyscirpenol  
• Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus  
• Ebola viruses  
• Francisella tularensis  
• Lassa fever virus  
• Marburg virus  
• Monkeypox virus  
• Reconstructed replication competent forms of the 1918 pandemic influenza 
virus containing any portion of the coding regions of all eight gene segments 
(Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus)  
• Ricin  
• Rickettsia prowazekii  
• Rickettsia rickettsii  
• Saxitoxin  
• Shiga-like ribosome inactivating proteins  
• Shigatoxin  
• South American Haemorrhagic Fever viruses (Junin, Machupo, Sabia, Flexal, 
Guanarito)  
• Staphylococcal enterotoxins  
• T–2 toxin  
• Tetrodotoxin  
• Tick-borne encephalitis complex (flavi) viruses (Central European Tick-borne 
encephalitis, Far Eastern Tick-borne encephalitis [Russian Spring and Summer 
encephalitis, Kyasanur Forest disease, Omsk Hemorrhagic Fever]) 
• Variola major virus (Smallpox virus) and  
• Variola minor virus (Alastrim)  
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• Yersinia pestis  
(c) Genetic Elements, Recombinant Nucleic Acids, and Recombinant Organisms:  
(1) Nucleic acids that can produce infectious forms of any of the select agent 
viruses listed in paragraph (b) of this section.  
(2) Recombinant nucleic acids that encode for the functional form(s) of any of the 
toxins listed in paragraph (b) of this section if the nucleic acids:  
(i) Can be expressed in vivo or in vitro,  
or  
(ii) Are in a vector or recombinant host genome and can be expressed in vivo or 
in vitro.  
(3) HHS select agents and toxins listed in paragraph (b) of this section that have 
been genetically modified.  
(d) HHS select agents or toxins that meet any of the following criteria are 
excluded from the requirements of this part:  
(1) Any HHS select agent or toxin that is in its naturally occurring environment 
provided the select agent or toxin has not been intentionally introduced, 
cultivated, collected, or otherwise extracted from its natural source.  
(2) Non-viable HHS select agents or nonfunctional HHS toxins.  
(3) HHS toxins under the control of a principal investigator, treating physician or 
veterinarian, or commercial manufacturer or distributor, if the aggregate amount 
does not, at any time, exceed the following amounts: 100 mg of Abrin; 0.5 mg of 
Botulinum neurotoxins; 100 mg of Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin; 100 mg 
of Conotoxins; 1,000 mg of Diacetoxyscirpenol; 100 mg of Ricin; 100  
mg of Saxitoxin; 100 mg of Shiga-like ribosome inactivating proteins; 100 mg  
of Shigatoxin; 5 mg of Staphylococcal enterotoxins; 1,000 mg of T–2 toxin; or  
100 mg of Tetrodotoxin.  
(e) An attenuated strain of a HHS select agent or toxin may be excluded from the 
requirements of this part based upon a determination that the attenuated strain 
does not pose a severe threat to public health and safety.  
(1) To apply for an exclusion, an individual or entity must submit a written request 
and supporting scientific information. A written decision granting or denying the 
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request will be issued. An exclusion will be effective upon notification to the 
applicant. Exclusions will be published periodically in the notice section of the 
FEDERAL REGISTER and will be listed on the CDC Web site at  
http://www.cdc.gov/.  
(2) If an excluded attenuated strain is subjected to any manipulation that restores 
or enhances its virulence, the resulting select agent or toxin will be subject to the 
requirements of this part.  
(3) An individual or entity may make a written request to the HHS Secretary for 
reconsideration of a decision denying an exclusion application. The written 
request for reconsideration must state the facts and reasoning upon which the 
individual or entity relies to show the decision was incorrect. The  
HHS Secretary will grant or deny the request for reconsideration as promptly as 
circumstances allow and will state, in writing, the reasons for the decision.  
(f) Any HHS select agent or toxin seized by a Federal law enforcement agency 
will be excluded from the requirements of this part during the period between 
seizure of the select agent or toxin and the transfer or destruction of such agent 
or toxin provided that:  
(1) As soon as practicable, the Federal law enforcement agency transfers the 
seized select agent or toxin to an entity eligible to receive such agent or toxin or 
destroys the agent or toxin by a recognized sterilization or inactivation process,  
(2) The Federal law enforcement agency safeguards and secures the seized 
select agent or toxin against theft, loss, or release, and reports any theft, loss, or 
release of such agent or toxin, and  
(3) The Federal law enforcement agency reports the seizure of the select  
agent or toxin to CDC or APHIS. (i) The seizure of Botulinum  eurotoxins, Ebola 
viruses, Francisella tularensis, Lassa fever virus, Marburg virus, South American 
Haemorrhagic Fever virus (Junin, Machupo, Sabia, Flexal, Guanarito), Variola 
major virus (Smallpox virus), Variola minor (Alastrim), or Yersinia pestis must be 
reported within 24 hours by telephone, facsimile, or e-mail. This report must be 
followed by submission of APHIS/CDC Form 4 within seven calendar days after 
seizure of the select agent or toxin.  
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(ii) For all other HHS select agents or toxins, APHIS/CDC Form 4 must be 
submitted within seven calendar days after seizure of the agent or toxin.  
(iii) A copy of APHIS/CDC Form 4 must be maintained for three years.  
(4) The Federal law enforcement agency reports the final disposition of the select 
agent or toxin by submission of APHIS/CDC Form 4. A copy of the completed 
form must be maintained for three years.  
 
[70 FR 13316, Mar. 18, 2005, as amended at 70 FR 61049, Oct. 20, 2005; 73 FR 
61365, Oct. 16, 2008; 73 FR 64554, Oct 
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